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I. INTRODUCTION
Domestic violence is the most common tort committed in our country, in-
volving nearly 1.3 million victims.1  When a domestic violence incident oc-
curs, the press regularly reports it.2  Highlighted in these articles is the name of 
the perpetrator.3
Perpetrators identified as committing an act of domestic violence face pub-
lic outrage, contempt, and stigma.4  This is particularly true if a court determines 
that the act of domestic violence necessitates a civil protection order (CPO) that 
1. “Domestic violence is commonly defined as an actual or threatened criminal offense against 
an intimate partner or family member.”  Jane K. Stoever, Enjoining Abuse: The Case for Indefinite 
Domestic Violence Protection Orders, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1015, 1043 (2014).  “[A]n incident of do-
mestic violence occurs every nine seconds in this country.”  Diana E. Garrett & Shannon Fuller, Orders
of Protection Myths Dispelled; Practical Tips for All Montana Lawyers, MONT. LAW., May 2015, at 
6, 6.  “Each year, approximately 1.3 million women and 835,000 men are assaulted by an intimate 
partner.”  Hannah Brenner, Transcending the Criminal Law’s “One Size Fits All” Response to Domes-
tic Violence, 19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 301, 303 (2013).  Domestic violence “is more frequent 
than the combined number of automobile accidents, muggings, and stranger rapes [that women] expe-
rience.”  Stoever, supra, at 1057.  Seventy-one percent of Americans have reported they know someone 
who has been the victim of domestic violence.  See Brenner, supra, at 303.  Thirty million children 
each year are exposed to some type of family violence. See U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Services, 
Children’s Bureau, Domestic Violence and the Child Welfare System (2014), 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/domestic-violence/ [https://perma.cc/B9J7-C8ZP]. 
2.  In the last six months of 2016, 215 newspaper articles reported an arrest for an incident of 
domestic violence.  Westlaw search: advanced: DA(aft 06-28-2016 & bef 01-01-2017) & TI(Domestic 
/3 violence) & GEO-SMART(“1US73”) à Search Within: “arrested.” 
3.  Of the 215 articles reporting an arrest, 171 named the alleged perpetrator.  Id.
4. See Hamilton ex rel. Lethem v. Lethem, 193 P.3d 839, 846 (Haw. 2008).  The stigma associ-
ated with the label of a “batterer” or “wife beater” is not new.  At the beginning of the century, “wife 
beating was viewed as disgraceful,” and perpetrators would go to great lengths to avoid the stigma. 
Elizabeth Katz, Judicial Patriarchy and Domestic Violence: A Challenge to the Conventional Family 
Privacy Narrative, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 379, 381 (2015).  This included bribing a judge 
to prevent newspaper coverage of the case, and filing a libel action against a newspaper that called 
them “wife beater.” Id. at 381.  Some perpetrators even committed suicide. See id. at 382. 
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bars the perpetrator from having any contact with the victim.5  Nearly 1.2 mil-
lion people receive a CPO each year.6  More people use this civil remedy than 
those who seek a tort remedy, or those who are involved with the criminal jus-
tice system.7
The CPO process, and its related orders, produces real and lasting “preju-
dicial collateral legal consequences” that extend past the life of the CPO.8
These consequences can include preventing the perpetrator from finding or 
keeping employment, obtaining a professional license, or being admitted to an 
5. See Jessica Miles, We Are Never Ever Getting Back Together: Domestic Violence Victims, 
Defendants, and Due Process, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 141, 148–49 (2013) (“Generally, a victim obtains 
a temporary CPO by filing a petition at the courthouse or at a police station when the court is closed, 
on an ex parte basis.  In most states, the victim must allege (1) a relationship with the defendant and 
(2) recent violence or threats creating an imminent risk of future violence.  A temporary CPO will 
remain in effect for a relatively short time period (typically one to two weeks) during which time the 
victim will try to obtain service of process on the defendant via law enforcement or other means, de-
pending on the jurisdiction. . . .  Once the defendant is served with the temporary CPO, the parties 
return to court for a hearing on the issue of entry of a final CPO. . . .  At the final hearing, a victim 
bears the burden of proof, generally with a preponderance of the evidence standard.”). 
6. See Maureen Sheeran & Emilie Meyer, Civil Protection Orders: A Guide for Improving Prac-
tice, NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES 1, 3 (2010), http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/de-
fault/files/cpo_guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Y56-A79K]; Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, Nat’l 
Inst. of Justice & The Centers For Disease Control & Prevention, Extent, Nature, And Consequences 
Of Intimate Partner Violence: Findings From The National Violence Against Women Survey 1, 54 
(2000), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181867.pdf [https://perma.cc/PXU8-BTLZ] (noting 
“1,131,999 victims of intimate partner rape, physical assault, and stalking obtain protective or restrain-
ing orders against their attackers annually”).  While this article discusses the number of CPOs granted 
each year, it will not discuss the overall number of filings each year.  This is because many states do 
not capture the filing data.  Two states and the District of Columbia collect data on the number of CPO 
filings.  This data gives some idea of the number of CPO cases filed each year.  Ohio had 17,019 filings 
in 2014.  The Supreme Court of Ohio & The Ohio Judicial System, CIVIL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASE
STATISTICS http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/jcs/domesticviolence/resources/data.asp 
[https://perma.cc/X779-MN9Y] (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).  The District of Columbia had 5,005 in 
2013.  DC Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Domestic Violence in the District of Columbia
(2014), http://www.dccadv.org/img/fck/file/2013%20DC%20DV%20Statistics%20One%20Page.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7R4J-G3CJ].  Maryland had 24,315 in 2014.  Maryland Judiciary, Annual Statistical 
Abstract (2014). 
http://mnadv.org/_mnadvWeb/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/MD-Judiciary-Statistical-Abstract-
FY2014-DV.pdf [https://perma.cc/428Y-Z2L7]. 
7. See Stoever, supra note 1, at 1019. 
8. Putman v. Kennedy, 900 A.2d 1256, 1263 (Conn. 2006). 
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academic institution.9  The prejudicial legal consequences arise because infor-
mation about the perpetrator’s involvement in a CPO case is not confidential.10
At least twenty-seven states, Guam and Puerto Rico allow public access to pro-
tection order files.11
This continuing public access to CPO cases, even when there is no active 
order,12 means the former batterer is subjected to perpetual prejudicial conse-
quences from the CPO case.  To end these ongoing consequences, the courts 
should allow perpetrators to seal inactive CPO cases from public view.  This 
sealing remedy is necessary to ameliorate the significant economic impact of 
those consequences. 
Most CPO perpetrators suffer these consequences because they are not con-
sidered rich or famous enough to avert the eventual consequences through 
power structures that protect them or their image.  The best example of this 
protective power structure can be seen with professional athletes who have 
committed an act of domestic violence with little or no consequence to their 
careers.13  Their fame and wealth allows them to escape the consequences and 
gives them a second chance.  But it should not be just the rich and famous who 
are forgiven and given a second chance.  Every person deserves a second chance 
and an opportunity to support their families and be contributing members of 
their communities.  A sealing remedy for inactive CPO cases would ensure such 
an even-handed result. 
Proposing a remedy to help those once labeled a batterer may ignite contro-
versy.  As one author has noted, “[w]orking to improve the conditions abusers 
face has long been considered taboo in the battered women’s movement.”14
However, the sealing remedy proposed by this article is not at odds with the 
9. This Article is focused on the collateral consequences that flow from a CPO issued by a civil
court.  It will not discuss the collateral consequences that occur if the perpetrator is convicted in crim-
inal court for domestic violence.  For a further discussion of the civil collateral consequences that flow 
from a criminal conviction, see Sahl, infra note 16, at 31–47. 
10. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice, Survey of State Criminal 
History Information Systems, 2012, A Criminal Justice Information Policy Report 1, 5–6 (2014),
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/244563.pdf [https://perma.cc/36KC-RECY]. 
11. Id. at Table 7a.  These states include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colo-
rado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Ver-
mont, Virginia, and Washington.  Id.
12. See infra Part III.
13. For a discussion of the specific athletes, see infra notes 207–09.
14. Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice, Tempering the State’s Response to Domestic Violence,
43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843, 1848 (2002). 
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CPO process and its underlying rationale.  A CPO is to provide “a simple, im-
mediate remedy to increase the safety of victims.”15  Once the court, or the 
victim, determines that the CPO is no longer necessary for the victim’s safety, 
the CPO has achieved its purpose, so the collateral consequences related to the 
CPO should end as well. 
Part II of this Article discusses the prejudicial legal consequences—
collateral consequences—stemming from CPO cases.  It is going to detail how 
collateral consequences, once recognized primarily in criminal cases, now 
plague those involved in all stages of a civil domestic violence case.16
Part III of this Article examines the reach of collateral consequences arising 
from CPO cases, particularly those CPO cases where the order has expired or 
has been dismissed.  There are millions of people in this country each day that 
battle the collateral consequences of their expired or dismissed orders.17  Each 
year courts issue 1.2 million CPO orders, and most of those orders expire in 
one to two years.18
Additionally, victims—and the courts—dismiss a large number of CPO 
cases where an order has been issued.19  In some jurisdictions, the dismissals 
equal the number of cases that result in a final order.20  Even though the orders 
15. Peter Finn & Sara Colson, Civil Protection Orders: Legislation, Current Court Practice, and 
Enforcement, NAT’L INST. JUST. ISSUES AND PRACTICES 4 (1990), 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/123263NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/XG6J-3YJ5]. 
16. Collateral consequences that arise after a conviction in a criminal case have been well docu-
mented and widely discussed. See Joann Sahl, Battling Collateral Consequences: The Long Road to 
Redemption, 49 CRIM. L. BULL. 383 (2013); see also Rebecca Vallas, Melissa Boteach, Rachel West 
& Jackie Odum, Removing Barriers to Opportunity for Parents with Criminal Records and Their Chil-
dren, A Two-Generation Approach, CENT. FOR AM. PROGRESS 1, 5 (2015), https://cdn.americanpro-
gress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/09060720/CriminalRecords-report2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E9Y5-N96A].  As one recent study concluded, “having even a minor criminal record 
can be a life sentence to poverty, presenting obstacles to employment, housing, education and training, 
public assistance, financial empowerment, and more.” Id. at 1.  The study estimates that nearly half of 
the children in the U.S. have one parent with a criminal record.  Id.
17. This Article is not going to focus on the collateral consequences that arise for the 1.2 million
people who are subject to an ongoing CPO, because these consequences are to be expected.  The CPO 
court only issues an order if it concludes the perpetrator committed the act of domestic violence after 
conducting a full court hearing that gave the perpetrator an opportunity to rebut the allegations.  The 
court’s issuance of a CPO means that the perpetrator committed the act, and his behavior requires 
monitoring during the life of the order.  This active order naturally gives rise to prejudicial conse-
quences because the CPO should give pause to those who seek to employ or to house a perpetrator 
subject to an ongoing order. 
18. For a chart detailing the periods permitted by the statute in each state, see Stoever, supra note 
1, at 1093–98. 
19. Laurie S. Kohn, The Justice System and Domestic Violence: Engaging the Case but Divorc-
ing the Victim, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 191, 205 (2008). 
20. Id. at 205 n.65.
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have been dismissed, the stigma of being a “batterer” remains.21  This is true 
even if the only order issued in the case was an interim order issued after an ex 
parte proceeding.22
As Part III will discuss, although a CPO order has expired or has been dis-
missed, it results in significant collateral consequences.23  These collateral 
consequences require a means to ameliorate their impact.  Part IV addresses 
this issue by articulating a judicial sealing remedy that all courts should adopt 
to seal inactive CPO cases from public view. 
II. THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CIVIL PROTECTION
ORDER
Every state in this country has a civil remedy to protect domestic violence 
victims.24  This remedy, identified in this article as a CPO, has been widely 
available since 1993.25
21. Courts recognize reputational harm as an impactful collateral consequence in CPO cases.  See
infra notes 67–72. 
22. Once a victim files a CPO case, she may appear before the judge in an ex parte proceeding 
to get a temporary no contact order. See Miles, supra note 5, at 149.  The efficacy of the ex parte order 
has been well documented.  “Emergency ex parte relief is an effective weapon in the arsenal available 
to combat domestic violence. By affording a victim the opportunity to obtain judicial relief without 
notice, that person can seek to extricate herself from the circumstance of violence, free from fear that 
further violence would be precipitated by notice to the abuser.  When an actual victim of domestic 
violence seeks ex parte relief, the propriety of this remedy is unassailable.”  David H. Taylor, Maria 
V. Stoilkov & Daniel J. Greco, Ex Parte Domestic Violence Orders of Protection: How Easing Access 
to Judicial Process Has Eased the Possibility for Abuse of the Process, 18 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 83, 
85 (2008).  The Family Violence Model Code suggests that states issue the ex parte order for no more 
than seventy-two hours. See Family Violence: A Model State Code, NAT’L COUNCIL JUV. & FAM. CT.
JUDGES 26 (1994), https://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/modecode_fin_printable.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RWU4-ZYL7] [hereinafter Family Violence: A Model State Code].  For a state-by-
state survey of the time limits of the ex parte protection order, see Stoever, supra note 1, at 1093–98.  
Every state must give full faith and credit to protection orders issued in another state. See Violence 
Against Women Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (2012). 
23. See, e.g., Wilder v. Perna, 883 N.E.2d 1095, 1099 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (“The threat of 
reputation harm is particularly significant in this context because domestic violence restraining orders 
will not issue in the absence of the showing of a threat of violence * * *. Thus, inasmuch as we 
previously have recognized the importance of reputation damage as a collateral consequence in other 
contexts, we see no reason not to do so here, for being the subject of a court order intended to prevent 
or stop domestic violence may well cause harm to the reputation and legal record of the defendant.”). 
24. See Stoever, supra note 1, at 1042–43. 
25. See Brenner, supra note 1, at 316–17.  For a list of civil protection orders by state, see Amer-
ican Bar Association Commission on Domestic Violence, Domestic Violence Civil Protection Orders 
(CPOs) By State (2009), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/mi-
grated/domviol/pdfs/dv_cpo_chart.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5VP-KK6Q].  For a thorough 
discussion of the history of domestic violence laws, see Epstein, supra note 14, at 1849–56.  “Today, 
the legal system offers a fairly comprehensive response that has been constructed around the idea that 
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The CPO is the “cornerstone of the movement to address domestic vio-
lence,”26 “cast[ing] a far wider net over abusive behavior than criminal law 
does.”27  It addresses the “vital issue of safety for victims of domestic or family 
violence and other family or household members.”28  The National Council of 
Juvenile and Family Court judges concluded that that there are clear and artic-
ulable purposes for the CPO remedy that include “all the relief necessary to 
curtail access by a perpetrator.”29
A CPO has proven benefits.  It reduces subsequent violent abuse and psy-
chological abuse.30  It increases prompt police response to post-CPO incidents 
of domestic violence.31  A CPO allows victims to access much needed ser-
vices.32  Victims report a high level of satisfaction with the CPO process and 
result.33
The civil protection remedy is separate and supplemental to any criminal 
prosecution.34  A CPO case requires a lower standard of proof than that of a 
criminal case.  Victims need only prove their entitlement to a CPO by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.35
domestic violence is a critical social problem requiring a shift from considering it a private family 
matter and that victims are often uncooperative in the role they play as part of the broader system.”  
Brenner, supra note 1, at 315–16; see also Stoever, supra note 1, at 1042–43. 
26. Brenner, supra note 1, at 339. 
27. Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can Law 
Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1509 (2008). 
28. Family Violence: A Model State Code, supra note 22, at 24. 
29. Id. at 26. 
30. See Miles, supra note 5, at 147. 
31. See id. at 147. 
32. See Goldfarb, supra note 27, at 1509 (“A major advantage of civil protection orders is that 
they bring the domestic violence victim into contact with the legal system, which in turn opens the 
door to other community resources, such as social services agencies and battered women’s support 
groups.”).
33. See id. at 1510. 
34. There are “[f]undamental distinctions between the overall goals of the criminal system and 
the civil system . . . .  Because protection orders are civil, private rights of action, victims who file 
protection orders must by definition be afforded greater autonomy of decision-making than victims 
who are witnesses in criminal cases.  The victim, not the state, is the ‘prosecuting’ party.  The petitioner 
seeks a specific remedy, tailored to her unique needs and circumstances, without regard for whether 
the CPO will deter or punish the batterer - goals of the criminal justice system, and decidedly not goals 
of a civil injunction.” Tamara L. Kuennen, “No-Drop” Civil Protection Orders: Exploring the Bounds 
of Judicial Intervention in the Lives of Domestic Violence Victims, 16 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 88
(2007).
35. “The standard of proof to obtain a civil protection order is lower than the ‘beyond a reason-
able doubt’ standard that prevails in criminal cases.  Most state statutes that address the issue apply a 
preponderance of the evidence standard to civil protection order proceedings.”  Goldfarb, supra note 
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States intend for civil protection regimes to provide an easily 
accessible, free-standing civil cause of action for a victim to 
obtain immediate, temporary, injunctive relief from physical 
violence. These statutes aspire to provide victims with safety, 
space, time and the wherewithal to escape and to establish 
themselves independently and safely.36
Others have commented that the CPO accomplishes the most important 
goal for the domestic violence, victim-empowerment.37
Not contained in any of these laudable goals is the idea that the CPO is to 
impose a permanent and prejudicial economic burden on the perpetrator.  Its 
impact should continue only as long as the court feels the order is necessary to 
protect the victim.38  Professor Jane K. Stoever, a noted expert in the CPO area, 
reconfirms this point.39 She writes that a “civil protection order remedy should 
be flexible enough to provide an abuse victim with tailored long-term protec-
tion while also allowing for modification or termination by the respondent if 
the order becomes unnecessary.”40
Once the victim-centered purpose of the order becomes unnecessary, its 
impact, including the prejudicial collateral consequences, should end.  After all, 
27, at 1509 n.136; see also Helen Eigenberg et al., Protective Order Legislation: Trends in State Stat-
utes, 31 J. CRIM. JUST. 411, 415–16 (2003).
36. Jeffrey R. Baker, Enjoining Coercion: Squaring Civil Protection Orders with the Reality of 
Domestic Abuse, 11 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 35, 38–39 (2008); see also Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. 
Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law,
21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 1052 (1993) (recognizing the “intent of the civil protection order statute of 
offering victims swift and immediate protection”). 
37. See Linda G. Mills, Commentary, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of 
State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 577 (1999) (“Empowerment provides a space for the bat-
tered women to decide how to proceed in the healing process.  This kind of empowerment does not 
imply that she is obligated to choose among options; rather, it suggests the need for those involved in 
the healing process to present options and relevant data, encouraging the survivor to choose the path 
with which she is most comfortable.”). 
38. The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court judges recognized that the risk to victims 
is “not time limited or certain,” and the victim should be protected “for as long as that protection is 
required, which should be determined by the court after hearing.” Family Violence: A Model State 
Code, supra note 22, at 28.  A court also has limited jurisdiction over the issues it can consider when 
presented with a request for a civil protection order.  In addition to the protection order, courts may 
issue custody and visitation orders. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 36, at 886. 
39. Stoever, supra note 1, at 1090–91. 
40. Id. at 1091.  The author discusses this proposition in the context of permanent protection 
orders.  Questioning these orders, she states, “given that there is potential criminal liability for the 
violation of certain provisions of the remedial order, there are legitimate questions about the length of 
state involvement and the state’s role in ordering relationships that advise against making all protection 
orders permanent.” Id.
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a CPO is a civil remedy that “governs the future of the private relationship be-
tween those two parties.”41  The CPO, like other civil remedies, is generally 
intended to end once the threatened harm has ended.42  But its impact does not 
end when the case ends. Although there may no longer be an active CPO, col-
lateral consequences still flow from the CPO case. 
Collateral consequences, first recognized in criminal cases, have been de-
fined as civil disabilities that arise from a criminal conviction.43  A recent Amer-
ican Bar Association national survey identified approximately 45,000 collateral 
consequences.44  The chair of the American Bar Association Criminal Justice 
Section succinctly summarized the impact of these consequences during com-
mittee testimony before the House of Representatives: “As the laws restricting 
convicted persons in their ordinary life activities have multiplied, they have 
discouraged rehabilitation of offenders and created a class of people who live 
permanently at the margin of the law.”45
41. Kohn, supra note 19, at 233 (emphasis added). 
42. Id. at 234. 
43. “When a person is convicted of a crime, that person becomes subject to a host of legal disa-
bilities and penalties under state and federal law.  These so-called collateral consequences of conviction 
may continue long after the court-imposed sentence has been fully served.”  MARGARET COLGATE
LOVE, RELIEF FROM THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION: A STATE-BY-
STATE RESOURCE GUIDE ix (2006); see also Collateral Consequences, SENT’G PROJECT,
http://www.sentencingproject.org/issues/collateral-consequences [https://perma.cc/7CPB-3JB5].  
“Collateral consequences are distinct from direct consequences of convictions in that they are not for-
mally part of punishment or sentencing, and are triggered outside the jurisdiction of the criminal 
courts . . . .”  Matthew T. Mangino, Advising Clients of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction,
THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.thelegalintelli-
gencer.com/id=1202672318644?keywords=Advising+Clients+of+the+Collateral+Conse-
quences+of+Conviction&publication=The+Legal+Intelligencer [https://perma.cc/HFS5-CJAP].  
“Every sentence, unless it is death or life without parole, will have a beginning and an end. Collateral 
penalties have the capacity to go on forever.” Id.
44. See Collateral Consequences: Hearing Before the Over-Criminalization Task Force of 2014 
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 22 (2014) (prepared statement of Mathias H. Heck Jr., 
Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County, Dayton, Ohio) [hereinafter Heck].  
The National Institute of Justice funded the Collateral Consequences of Conviction Project. Id.  The 
Project developed a “state-by-state database of all collateral consequences of criminal convictions that 
exist in every jurisdiction’s code of laws and regulations.”  Id.  The project resulted in an online search-
able database.  National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of Conviction, ABA Collateral Conse-
quences of Criminal Convictions (2013), http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/WU4G-WWYC].  Ohio also has a searchable collateral consequences database.  See
CIVICC, http://civiccohio.org [https://perma.cc/S5M5-M3GT] (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).  This data-
base has identified over 700 collateral consequences contained in Ohio law. See OHIO JUSTICE &
POLICY CTR., THE OHIO CIVICC DATABASE (2005), http://hirenetwork.org/sites/de-
fault/files/CIVICC-1page.pdf [https://perma.cc/H98A-TSG7]. 
45. Heck, supra note 44, at 18. 
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The ABA national survey has captured the magnitude of the collateral con-
sequences’ problem, and it reflects a bitter reality for those convicted of a crim-
inal offense.46  Even after serving their time, those offenders face potentially 
lifelong civil disabilities imposed by law.  There is extensive academic litera-
ture dedicated to the collateral consequences’ problem arising from criminal 
cases and the potential solutions to ameliorate their impact.47
Unfortunately, collateral consequences are no longer neatly confined to 
criminal convictions.  The disabilities once experienced by those with criminal 
convictions now reach a completely new class of people, specifically those sub-
ject to a CPO.48 The collateral consequences flowing from a CPO have a 
“harsh” impact,49 and have “discouraged rehabilitation” resulting in “a class of 
people who live permanently at the margin of the law.”50
The first consequence former CPO perpetrators face is reputational harm. 
The stigma from a CPO case is significant.51  “[I]n the sensitive and often 
explosively litigated context of family dysfunction and dissolution, there is a 
reasonable possibility that a domestic violence restraining order will have 
prejudicial collateral legal consequences for its subject, even after its 
expiration.”52
The CPO related stigma burdens the perpetrator’s ability to find employ-
ment.53  Once a perpetrator is subject to an order, he may face permanent dis-
46. Id. at 23–24.
47. See MARGARET COLGATE LOVE ET AL., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL
CONVICTION: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE (2013 ed.); see also Michael Pinard, Reflections and Per-
spectives on Reentry and Collateral Consequences, 100 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1213, 1214–
16 (2010); Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 963, 979–80 (2013); Sahl, supra note 16. 
48. See Miles, supra note 5, at 151–52.
49. M. B. v. H. B., No. 02-34530, 2003 Del. Fam. Ct., LEXIS 15, at *12 (Del. Fam. Ct. May 2,
2003).
50. Heck, supra note 44, at 18.
51. Courts recognize the reputational harm of a CPO.  See Putman v. Kennedy, 900 A.2d 1256,
1262–63 (Conn. 2006); see also Wilder v. Perna, 883 N.E.2d 1095, 1099 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007); see
also Putman, 900 A.2d, at 1262–63 (“[I]nasmuch as we previously have recognized the importance of 
reputation damage as a collateral consequence in other contexts, we see no reason not to do so here, 
for being the subject of a court order intended to prevent or stop domestic violence may well cause 
harm to the reputation and legal record of the defendant.”); James v. Hubbard, 21 S.W.3d 558, 560 
(Tex. App. 2000) (“Although expired temporary protective orders and restraining orders have been 
considered moot, none of these cases has carried the same social stigma as a protective order granted 
based on a finding of family violence.”). 
52. Putman, 900 A.2d at 1263.
53. See Zachary C. Howenstine, Note, Conforming Doctrine to Practice: Making Room for
Collateral Consequences in the Missouri Mootness Analysis, 73 MO. L. REV. 859, 861–62 (2008); see
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qualification from certain jobs.  Federal law prohibits someone subject to a pro-
tection order from receiving, possessing, or transporting any firearms or ammu-
nition as part of his employment.54  A protection order may prevent any oppor-
tunities in teaching, law enforcement, or day care.55  It may also result in the 
denial of a professional license, a government position, or admission to an aca-
demic institution.56  The CPO may also limit the person’s ability to travel.57
Even if the alleged perpetrator has current employment, his label as a batterer 
may influence the continuation of that employment.58
The collateral consequences that operate as a bar to employment can have 
a direct impact on whether the perpetrator commits another act of domestic vi-
olence because there is a link between unemployment and incidents of domestic 
also Piper v. Layman, 726 A.2d 887, 891 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999). See generally D.R. v. J.R., No. 
26743, 2013 WL 3486845, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 10, 2013); Cauwenbergh v. Cauwenbergh, No 
2006-A-0008, 2007 WL 726951, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2007); Glover v. Michaud, 222 S.W.3d 
347, 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007); Smith v. Smith, 549 S.E.2d 912, 914 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).  Those with 
criminal convictions suffer greatly in the search for employment.  “The unemployment rate of formerly 
incarcerated offenders one year after release is estimated to be near 60 percent . . . .”  Mangino, supra
note 43, at 2.  “[S]tates with high rates of unemployment, as well as high rates of single-parent headed 
families, have higher rates of returns to prison.”  Tracy Sohoni, The Effect of Collateral Consequence 
Laws on State Rates of Returns to Prison, 82–83 (2013), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/247569.pdf [https://perma.cc/AM9X-XZKY] (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any individual, who to that individual’s 
knowledge and while being employed for any person described in any paragraph of subsection (g) of 
this section, in the course of such employment—(1) to receive, possess, or transport any firearm or 
ammunition in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce; or (2) to receive any firearm or ammunition 
which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”).  The reach and impact of 
this statute has the potential to be far ranging. A person could not work in a “firearm retail store, 
weapons manufacturing facility, or a shooting range.”  Peter Slocum, Comment, Biting the D.V. Bullet: 
Are Domestic-Violence Restraining Orders Trampling on Second Amendment Rights?, 40 SETON
HALL L. REV. 639, 658 (2010).  The author also discusses less obvious employment restrictions in-
cluding a professional trucker driver who needs to deliver sealed crates of guns or ammunition, an 
employee in a retail store with a sporting goods section that carries guns, and a server in a bar where 
his boss has a loaded firearm. See id. at 658–59.  In Hayford v. Hayford, 760 N.W.2d 503, 505 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2008), the court recognized that the alleged perpetrator had earned his living by building 
firearms and the order could result in his losing his livelihood. 
55. See Miles, supra note 5, at 151 n.55. 
56. See Smith, 549 S.E.2d at 914; see also Piper, 726 A.2d at 891; Hamilton ex rel. Lethem v. 
Lethem, 193 P.3d 839, 846 (Haw. 2008).  “[Sixty-six] percent of colleges and universities use 
background checks in the admissions process.”  Vallas et al., supra note 16, at 8. 
57. See M. B. v. H. B., No. 02-34530, 2003 Del. Fam. Ct., LEXIS 15, at *11 (Del. Fam. Ct. May 
2, 2003). 
58. A “CPO may lead a defendant’s current employer to deny him a promotion, demote him, or 
terminate his employment.”  Miles, supra note 5, at 151.  An employer may also ask an applicant to 
disclose any issued orders. See Howenstine, supra note 53, at 877. 
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violence.  Those who commit incidents of domestic violence are usually unem-
ployed or underemployed.59  One study identified an increase in the violence 
during a period of unemployment.60  “Concentrated disadvantage, employment 
instability, and subjective financial strain . . . continue to have significant ef-
fects on the likelihood of violence against women.  This result confirms the 
importance of both neighborhood socioeconomic disadvantage and individual-
level economic distress for the problem of violence against women.”61
The perpetrator’s unemployment particularly affects his children.  “When 
parents face challenges in securing employment or accessing basic income sup-
port to help meet basic needs, children suffer both short- and long-term negative 
consequences.”62  These include developing their vocabulary at a slower rate, 
having more limited language skills, and lower educational attainment.63  Hav-
ing an unemployed parent with a lower level of education diminishes the child’s 
59. See Catherine Elizabeth Kaukinen & Ráchael A. Powers, The Role of Economic Factors on 
Women’s Risk for Intimate Partner Violence: A Cross-National Comparison of Canada and the United 
States, 21 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 229, 242 (2014).  Less than full-time employment is a predictor 
of renewed abuse after the victim initiates the protection order proceedings.  See Christopher T. Beni-
tez, Dale E. McNiel, & Renee L. Binder, Do Protection Orders Protect?, 38 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 376, 383 (2010).  The “risk of intimate partner violence is highest among couples 
when the man is unemployed.”  Catherine Kaukinen, Status Compatibility, Physical Violence, and 
Emotional Abuse in Intimate Relationships, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 452, 456 (2004); see also EVE S.
BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DO ARRESTS & RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK 49 (1996) (citing to a 
number of studies to conclude, “[a]rrest reduces domestic violence among employed people but in-
creases it among unemployed people”); Janell D. Schmidt & Lawrence W. Sherman, Does Arrest Deter 
Domestic Violence, 36 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 601, 603 (1993).  These employment statistics are con-
sistent with research concentrating on criminal behavior.  The “research demonstrates that individuals 
who are unemployed are more likely than those who are employed to engage in criminal behavior and 
that individuals with a criminal record have poorer employment prospects than those without a record.” 
SCOTT H. DECKER ET AL., NAT’L. INST. JUSTICE, CRIMINAL STIGMA, RACE, GENDER AND 
EMPLOYMENT: AN EXPANDED ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF IMPRISONMENT FOR 
EMPLOYMENT 11 (2013).  “Having any lifetime arrest dims the employment prospects more than any 
other employment-related characteristic.” Id. at 52; see also Michael L. Benson & Greer L. Fox, Con-
centrated Disadvantage, Economic Distress, and Violence Against Women in Intimate Relationships,
II-3-3 (2004), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/199709.pdf. [https://perma.cc/SWC4-YJ6T] (“Alt-
hough intimate violence is found among all social classes, rates tend to be higher in families of lower 
socioeconomic status who are experiencing underemployment or unemployment.”). 
60. See Benson & Fox, supra note 59, at II-3-5 (“[T]he rate of violence increases as the number 
of periods of male unemployment increases.”). 
61. Id. at II-3-7.  Studies have shown “elevated intimate partner violence rates in urban neigh-
borhoods characterized by poverty/low income.” Amy E. Bonomi, Britton Trabert, Melissa L. Ander-
son, Mary A. Kernic, & Victoria L. Holt, Intimate Partner Violence and Neighborhood Income: A 
Longitudinal Analysis, 20 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 42, 43 (2014). 
62. Vallas et al., supra note 16, at 5. 
63. See id.
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future employment prospects.64
The collateral consequences attached to a CPO case are pervasive and prej-
udicial.  There is no escape for those who have been assigned the “batterer” 
label.
III. EXAMINING THE REACH OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES IN CPO CASES
It is no surprise that perpetrators subject to a CPO experience prejudicial
consequences.  After all, a court has determined that their behavior is an imme-
diate threat requiring court intervention and monitoring.  Unfortunately, even 
if a court’s interest in the perpetrator may have ended through termination of 
the CPO case, it does not end the perpetrator’s legal consequences. 
A. Collateral Consequences of Expired CPOs 
CPO cases terminate naturally when the issued CPO reaches the end of its 
time-limited order.65  Even though the order has expired, prejudicial conse-
quences continue to plague the person once subject to the CPO. 
Most courts addressing this issue confirm this principle.66  Twelve states 
and the U.S. Virgin Islands acknowledge that expired CPOs carry significant 
64. See id. at 9 (“[B]arriers to education and training associated with having a criminal record
not only hold parents back from climbing the career ladder but can hamper children’s educational and 
employment prospects as well.”). 
65. See Stoever, supra note 1, at 1050.
66. Courts typically address this argument as part of a mootness analysis.  In Carafas v. LaVallee,
391 U.S. 234 (1968), the United States Supreme Court recognized a “collateral consequence” 
exception to the mootness doctrine.  The Court stated: 
It is clear that petitioner’s cause is not moot. In consequence of his conviction, he 
cannot engage in certain businesses; he cannot serve as an official of a labor union 
for a specified period of time; he cannot vote in any election held in New York 
State; he cannot serve as a juror. Because of these “disabilities or burdens [which] 
may flow from” petitioner’s conviction, he has “a substantial stake in the 
judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed 
on him. On account of these “collateral consequences,” the case is not moot. 
Id. at 237 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 633–34 n.2 (1968); Fiswick v. United States, 
329 U.S. 211, 222 (1946)); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (recognizing collateral 
consequence where there is “some concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended 
incarceration or parole”).  “An appeal may be heard which might otherwise be dismissed as moot where 
leaving the judgment undisturbed might lead to negative collateral consequences.”  Roark v. Roark, 
551 N.E.2d 865, 867 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); In re Marriage of Stariha, 509 N.E.2d 1117, 1123 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1987).  The reasoning behind this exception is that “it is far better to eliminate the source of a 
potential legal disability than to require the citizen to suffer the possibly unjustified consequences of 
the disability itself for an indefinite period of time . . . .”  Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968). 
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collateral consequences.67  Each of these courts recognizes the reputational 
harm that accompanies the expired CPO order.68  As the Connecticut Supreme 
Court acknowledged, the “threat of reputation harm is particularly significant 
in this context because domestic violence restraining orders will not issue in the 
absence of the showing of a threat of violence, specifically a ‘continuous threat 
of present physical pain or physical injury’ to the applicant.”69  An expired order 
carries “legitimate public contempt for abusers,”70 and the “inherent reputa-
tional harm and stigma associated with a finding that one has committed [an act 
of] domestic violence.”71  The reputational harm is significant.  It “can have a 
self-fulfilling criminogenic effect, predisposing individuals to become the de-
viants they were branded to be.”72
67. Arizona (Cardoso v. Soldo, 277 P.3d 811, 814 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012) (expired order)); Con-
necticut (see generally Putman v. Kennedy, 900 A.2d 1256, 1265 (Conn. 2006) (expired CPO)); Flor-
ida (see generally Pryor v. Pryor, 141 So. 3d 1279, 1280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (expired temporary 
injunction)); Hawaii (see generally Hamilton ex rel. Lethem v. Lethem, 193 P.3d 839, 847–48 (Haw. 
2008)); Iowa (see generally Siemonsma v. Siemonsma, No. 01-0247, 2002 WL 1331870, at *1 (Iowa  
Ct. App. June 19, 2002) (expired temporary order)); Ohio (see generally Wilder v. Perna, 883 N.E.2d 
1095, 1099 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (expired order); Cauwenbergh v. Cauwenbergh, No 2006-A-0008, 
2007 WL 726951,  at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2007) (expired order); D.R. v. J.R., No. 26743, 2013 
WL 3486845, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 10, 2013) (expired order)); Maryland (see generally Piper v. 
Layman, 726 A.2d 887, 891 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (expired order)); Massachusetts (see
Wooldridge v. Hickey, 700 N.E.2d 296, 298 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (expired order)); Michigan (see
generally Hayford v. Hayford, 760 N.W.2d 503, 505 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (expired order)); Minne-
sota (see generally Pechovnik v. Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 96 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (expired or-
der)); New Jersey (see generally Shah v. Shah, 875 A.2d 931, 940 (N.J. 2005) (ex parte order with no 
further legal proceedings)); Wisconsin (see generally In Interest of H.Q.,152 Wis. 2d 701, 449 N.W.2d 
75, 77–78 (Ct. App. 1989) (expired order)); U.S. Virgin Islands (see generally Vazquez v. Vazquez, 
54 V.I. 485, 492, (V.I. 2010) (expired order)). 
68. See generally Cardoso, 277 P.3d at 816; Putman, 900 A.2d, at 1265; Hamilton, 193 P.3d at 
849; Vazquez, 54 V.I. at 492. 
69. Putman, 900 A.2d, at 1262.  The court also recognized the widespread impact of the order 
since it is disseminated to multiple law enforcement agencies.  Id.; see also Hamilton, 193 P.3d at 84 
(Hawaii court acknowledging the “enhanced technology for information dissemination”); Vazquez, 54 
V.I. at 492. 
70. Hawaii (Hamilton, 193 P.3d, at 846). 
71. Vazquez, 54 V.I. at 492; see also Hamilton, 193 P.3d, at 846 (recognizing the “‘social stigma’ 
of a ‘protective order granted based on a finding of family violence’”); James v. Hubbard, 21 S.W.3d 
558, 560 (Tex. App. 2000) (civil protection order “carries a significant stigma in our society”).  The 
court also acknowledged that the order “prevented appellant from worshiping at what could have been 
his preferred place and time of worship for a year.” Id. at 560–61; see also Wooldridge, 700 N.E.2d 
at 298 (expired order carries stigma for his name and record); State v. S. T. S., 238 P.3d 53, 56 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2010) (recognizing a “social stigma associated with a finding that father perpetrated domestic 
violence”). See generally Smith v. Smith, 549 S.E.2d 912, 914 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (expired order 
carries stigma); Piper, 726 A.2d at 891 (stigma “is likely to attach to a person judicially determined to 
have committed abuse subject to protection under the Domestic Violence Act”). 
72. Wayne A. Logan, Essay, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1107 
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Another weighty collateral consequence the courts recognize is that the 
CPO, although expired, can affect the future legal rights of the perpetrator.73  It 
can be used by “agencies investigating future allegations involving the same 
family,”74 including a subsequent finding of violence necessitating a protection 
order.75  It may also be a factor a trial court considers in a divorce,76 or in mak-
ing a custody determination.77  In addition, if the perpetrator is charged with 
another incident of domestic violence, the court will consider the expired order 
in determining a sentence, including whether the perpetrator may receive a de-
ferred sentence.78  The expired CPO may also affect court decisions in “future 
bail proceedings, . . . future presentence investigations, [and] in-court impeach-
ments.”79
Courts also acknowledge that the expired CPO will negatively affect the 
perpetrator’s personal life, including “association[s] with neighbors, and choice 
of housing.”80 It can reduce the perpetrator’s credit rating.81  The expired CPO 
may also interfere with the perpetrator’s ability to have certain employment.82
Although there are a significant number of courts that recognize the preju-
dicial consequences of expired orders, not all courts agree with this conclusion. 
As one court stated, 
[w]hile restrictions of certain constitutional rights may be 
(2013).
73. See Putman, 900 A.2d, at 1262–63; see also Hamilton, 193 P.3d, at 846; Pechovnik v. 
Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 98 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009); In Interest of H.Q., 152 Wis. 2d 701, 449 
N.W.2d 75, 78 (Ct. App. 1989); Vazquez, 54 V.I. at 492. See generally Cardoso v. Soldo, 277 P.3d 
811, 814 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012). 
74. Putman, 900 A.2d, at 1263. 
75. See Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d at 98.  See generally Piper, 726 A.2d at 891. 
76. See In Interest of H.Q., 152 Wis. 2d at 707.  See generally Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d at 94. 
77. See Putman, 900 A.2d at 1263; see also Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d at 98; Vazquez, 54 V.I. at 
492; In Interest of H.Q., 152 Wis. 2d at 707–08; Smith v. Smith, 549 S.E.2d 912, 914 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2001).  “All states at least require the court to consider evidence of domestic violence when determin-
ing child custody, and many states have a rebuttable presumption against the abusive parent receiving 
custody.” Stoever, supra note 1, at 1077. 
78. See Vazquez, 54 V.I. at 493. 
79. Hamilton ex rel. Lethem v. Lethem, 193 P.3d 839, 846 (Haw. 2008); accord Wooldridge v. 
Hickey, 700 N.E.2d 296, 298 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999). 
80. Hamilton, 193 P.3d, at 848.  Landlords do use background checks to screen tenants.  “An 
estimated four out of five landlords employ background checks to screen out prospective tenants with 
criminal records.”  Rebecca Vallas & Sharon Dietrich, One Strike and You’re Out, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS 19 (2014). 
81. Cauwenbergh v. Cauwenbergh, No 2006-A-0008, 2007 WL 726951, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Mar. 9, 2007); see also D.R. v. J.R., No. 26743, 2013 WL 3486845, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 10, 
2013) (recognizing perpetrator may not drive school bus). 
82.  Cauwenbergh, 2007 WL 726951, at *2.  See D.R., 2013 WL 3486845, at *2. 
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among the consequences of an entry of a DVPO [Domestic Vi-
olence Protection Order], such restrictions exist only for the 
limited duration of the DVPO.  In this sense, the restrictions 
are more like direct consequences, rather than collateral conse-
quences, because they do not outlive the DVPO’s expiration.83
Ten states refuse to recognize that expired orders carry serious collateral 
consequences.84  In J.S. v. D.C.,85 the alleged perpetrator argued that because 
of an expired CPO he would “be subjected to ‘a potential present and future 
negative background check’ which could lead to ‘the denial of employment, 
loans, and ability to buy or rent a dwelling.’”86  The court rejected this argument 
finding that he “merely conclude[d]” that he might face collateral conse-
quences, but did not show that he had actually been “subjected to significant 
collateral consequences.”87
Although the issue of whether collateral consequences survive the end of a 
CPO case divides the courts, the better position is that the collateral conse-
quences are real and debilitating, and it is important to end the reach of these 
consequences for expired CPOs.
B. Collateral Consequences of CPO Case Terminations—Dismissals and 
Expired Ex Parte Orders 
Those once subject to a CPO case experience prejudicial consequences 
83. T.A.M. v. C.M.K., No. 12–0544, 2013 WL 5508282, at *3 (W. Va. Oct. 4, 2013). 
84. Iowa (see generally Siemonsma v. Siemonsma, No. 01–0247, 2002 WL 1331870, at *1 (Iowa  
Ct. App. June 19, 2002) (Since the protection order expired, “case no longer presents a justiciable 
controversy.”)); Maine (see generally Young v. Young, 810 A.2d 418, 421 (Me. 2002) (“Because the 
parental rights and responsibilities provision in the October 18 protection from abuse order is no longer 
operative, there are no practical effects that will flow to either party from our determination of this 
appeal.”)); Missouri (see generally J.S. v. D.C., 368 S.W.3d 289, 292–93 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012)); New 
Mexico (see generally Lucero v. Pino, 946 P.2d 232, 235 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (protection order did 
not have “any legal impact on the adoption or upon the current custody situation”)); Vermont (see
generally State v. Mott, 692 A.2d 360, 367 (Vt. 1997) (expired order had no impact on the criminal 
conviction)); New York (see generally Noor v. Noor, 15 A.D.3d 788, 790 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) 
(challenge to expired order is moot)); Nebraska (see generally Gernstein v. Allen, 630 N.W.2d 672, 
677 (Neb. Ct. App. 2001) (“[R]ecord is devoid of any evidence in the present case to show that Allen 
was criminally convicted of any crime resulting from the issuance of the protection order, or that any 
other rights or liabilities were actually affected by its issuance.”)); Pennsylvania (see generally Snyder 
v. Snyder, 629 A.2d 977, 980 n.1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (Court not “totally persuaded” that expired 
order “could impact on the way a trial court views the equities in a divorce or child custody proceed-
ing.”)); Utah (see generally Barnett v. Adams, 273 P.3d 378, 381 (Utah Ct. App. 2012) (Collateral 
consequences involving foster, adopting or working with children “merely speculative.”)). 
85. 368 S.W.3d at 293.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 292–93. 
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even if the victim or the court voluntarily ends the case.  This case termination 
can occur when a court or victim dismisses the case—either before or after any 
order has issued in the case.88  It may also occur if the victim chooses not to 
pursue the case after receiving an ex parte stay-away order from the court.89
The court issues an ex parte order in a CPO case once it has found that there is 
“recent violence or threats creating an imminent risk of future violence.”90  This 
finding is devastating to the perpetrator’s future opportunities—even if the 
court takes no further action in the case.91  This is because the court has added 
its imprimatur that the perpetrator committed an act of domestic violence.  Be-
ing labelled as a “batterer,” even in a case resulting in termination, results in 
stigma and reputational harm for the identified perpetrator.92
The depth of the collateral consequences problem for terminated cases is 
reflected in the sheer number of CPO cases with this result.  Victims—and the 
courts—dismiss a significant number of filed CPO cases.  Some jurisdictions 
have case dismissal rates that equal the number of cases resulting in a final 
order.93  For example, Ohio trial courts resolved 114,724 CPO cases from 
2002–2013.94  Of those, the courts dismissed 50,313 cases, or 43% of the 
cases.95  Similarly, parties filed 40,499 protection order cases in Missouri in 
2007.96  Of those cases filed, the parties or the court dismissed 63% of the 
88. CPO cases are dismissed for any number of reasons.  Victims might choose not to pursue the 
case. See Kohn, supra note 19, at 205–06 (“Dismissing dozens of cases weekly for petitioner’s failure 
to appear, judges cannot help but notice victims’ tenuous relationships with the system.  Even victims 
who pursue their protection orders often return to court later to vacate those orders.”).  “Petitioners 
frequently ‘drop’ cases or request that the court dismiss the case because of respondents’ threats of 
increased violence.”  Jane K. Stoever, Freedom from Violence: Using the Stages of Change Model to 
Realize the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 303, 334–35 (2011). “In addition, 
petitions are regularly dismissed because of the inability to serve a respondent.” Id. at 336.
89. See id. at 321.
90. Miles, supra note 5, at 148.
91. See Wooldridge v. Hickey, 700 N.E.2d 296, 298 (Mass. App. Ct.1999) (expired order carries 
stigma for name and record).
92. For a discussion of the reputational harm in CPO cases, see Putman v. Kennedy, 900 A.2d
1256, 1262–63 (Conn. 2006). 
93. See Kohn, supra note 19, at 205 n.65.
94. See The Supreme Court of Ohio & The Ohio Judicial System, CIVIL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
CASE STATISTICS, https://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/jcs/domesticviolence/resources/data.asp
[https://perma.cc/B9AL-SV4L] (last visited Feb. 7, 2017). 
95. Id.
96. See COMMUNICATING WITH PRISONERS, RESTRAINING ORDERS AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
BY U.S. STATES, PUBLIC INTEREST ANALYSIS, http://acrosswalls.org/datasets/punishment-us-dv-
states/?otxkey=datasets-punishment-us-dv-states [https://perma.cc/WM5M-CGW3] [hereinafter 
COMMUNICATING WITH PRISONERS].
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cases.97  The North Carolina courts granted 22,044 CPO petitions from 1999–
2001, but dismissed 56% of the filed cases.98  The parties filed 90,534 petitions 
from 2010–2012 in Washington, and the courts denied or dismissed nearly 20% 
of the cases.99
Dismissals also occur with great frequency after the victim has received an 
ex parte order from the court.  Courts grant ex parte requests at high rate—“in 
some jurisdictions, nearly one hundred percent.”100  The reason is “societal 
pressures might make it an unrealistic expectation that judges are able to sort 
out the justified [allegations] from the unjustified, and caution can tip the bal-
ance in favor of granting the ex parte order.”101
Many of those who receive an ex parte order fail to follow through with the 
case to get a full order.  By some measures, nearly 50% of those receiving an 
ex parte order do not pursue the full order.102  One study found that “[w]hile 
99% of women obtained the first stage or ex parte order,” only 41% received 
the full protection order, and 30% did not go back for the CPO hearing.103
A review of the statistics available from several jurisdictions supports this 
precipitous drop.  The courts in Kentucky granted 71,199 temporary orders 
from 2009–2011, but only 31,070, or 43% of the cases, resulted in a final or-
der.104  New Hampshire courts had 4,616 domestic violence filings in 2011, and 
3,637, or 78%, received a temporary ex parte order.105  Just 45% then received 
a full order.106  In Pennsylvania 88% of those who filed for a CPO from 2009–
2011 received an ex parte order, but only 33% of all cases filed resulted in a 
full order.107
There are reasons why a victim may end the case after receiving an ex parte 
order.  The victims recognize it as a successful form of relief.108  Many victims 
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. Taylor et al., supra note 22, at 86. 
101. Id. at 93. 
102. Kohn, supra note 19, at 205 n.65. 
103. Jane C. Murphy, Engaging with the State: The Growing Reliance on Lawyers and Judges 
to Protected Battered Women, 11 J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 499, 508–09 (2003). 
104. See COMMUNICATING WITH PRISONERS, supra note 96. 
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See Susan L. Keilitz, Paula L. Hannaford & Hillery S. Efkeman, National Center for State 
Courts, Civil Protection Orders, The Benefits and Limitations for Victims of Domestic Violence, 4–5 
(1997), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/164866NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/WF34-
UA5N]. 
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go no further with their CPO case because they conclude that the ex parte order 
achieves their goals.109
In general, courts take a cautious approach to dismissal requests from a vic-
tim seeking to end a CPO case.110  For example, 
New Jersey permits the court to dismiss a civil protection order 
upon motion only if the court has a full record in front of it. 
The Idaho statute allows for court modification of a civil pro-
tection order if the petitioner, voluntarily and without duress, 
consents to the waiver of any part of the order.  Maine, Minne-
sota, and Nevada require notice to the petitioner and a hearing 
before the respondent may dismiss a protection order.111
The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges also advises 
courts to “[e]xplain to a petitioner who wishes to withdraw her petition that she 
is always welcome to seek a new order if the violence or threat of violence 
resumes after dismissal, modification, or termination of the order.”112
This process-oriented approach to dismissing CPO cases stands in stark 
contrast to the process in any other civil case.  In other civil cases, a court nor-
mally will grant any good faith request to vacate an order.113  This process, 
unlike CPO cases, does not require the additional step of a court hearing where 
the party must attest that they truly want to dismiss the case.114
The literature supports the victim’s choice to end the CPO case.  “[V]ictims 
are generally the best predictors of their own risk of being seriously injured.  
Victims have a unique ability to predict the violence and anticipate the degree 
of violence.”115  Research has also shown that “women who experience intimate 
109. See Murphy, supra note 103, at 513 (providing list of comments from CPO recipients on 
the benefits of an ex parte order alone). 
110. Klein & Orloff, supra note 36, at 1068; see also Kohn, supra note 19, at 225 (noting that 
judges have shifted from a pro forma grant of motions to vacate to denying the motions). 
111. Klein & Orloff, supra note 36, at 1068.  National Council of Juvenile and Family Court 
Judges has stated that courts should “[d]iscourage written and unwritten policies that penalize victims 
for seeking to modify or terminate orders to permit contact or reconciliation with the perpetrator.”  
Sheeran & Meyer supra note 6, at 16. 
112. Sheeran & Meyer, supra note 6, at 8. 
113. See Kohn, supra note 19, at 234; Michael E. Solimine & Amy E. Lippert, Deregulating
Voluntary Dismissals, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 367, 383 (2003) (“[D]ismissals are sought or obtained 
with some frequency in both federal and state courts.”). 
114. See Kohn, supra note 19, at 232. 
115. Camille Carey & Robert A. Solomon, Impossible Choices: Balancing Safety and Security 
in Domestic Violence Representation, 21 CLINICAL L. REV. 201, 249 (2014).  “Victims who were at 
greatest risk of future harm were those who felt somewhat safe and therefore did not take proactive 
action to seek safety, such as separating from the abuser or safety planning.” Id. at 251; see also Mills, 
supra note 37, at 605; Margaret E. Johnson, Changing Course in the Anti-Domestic Violence Legal 
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partner abuse often decrease their exposure to violence when they exercise their 
own agency.”116
CPO dismissals occur, in part, because the filing alone may accomplish the 
victim’s goal.  “[S]tudies suggest that civil protection orders are effective be-
cause the victim seeks the protection in the first place.  By petitioning for an 
order, the victim shifts the power dynamic in her relationship, signaling to her 
abuser that she demands liberation and inviting public scrutiny of her plight.”117
Concomitantly, studies show that while receiving an order of protection reduces 
the risk of future violence,118 retention of the order does not impact re-abuse 
rates.119  Other studies have indicated that seeking the protection order is pivotal 
to decreasing the violence.120  “Our results agree with those of others reporting 
significantly lower levels of violence experienced by women seeking assistance 
from the justice system, irrespective of the justice system outcome.”121  More-
over, it is the short-term impact of that order that is most meaningful—most 
violations of the protection order occur in the first three months after the court 
issues the order.122
Women seek a CPO “to regain some measure of control in their lives by 
making the abuse public,”123 and by using it “as a ‘loudspeaker’ to notify the 
Movement: From Safety to Security, 60 VILL. L. REV. 145, 150 (2015). 
116. Johnson, supra note 115, at 178.  “The victim-empowerment model is widely held by do-
mestic violence experts to be the approach that best addresses the needs of battered women and men.” 
Erin L. Han, Note, Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop Policies: Victim Empowerment in Domestic Vio-
lence Cases, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 159, 169 (2003). 
117. Baker, supra note 36, at 36. 
118. See Judith McFarlane et al., Abused Women with Children Who Are First-Time Users of a 
Shelter or Applicants for a Protection Order: Entry Data of a 7-Year Prospective Analysis, 21 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 249, 252 (2014). 
119. See id.  One author has noted that for those domestic violence cases resulting in a criminal 
prosecution, “recidivism was unaffected by whether a case was dropped, dismissed, or prosecuted.” 
Mills, supra note 37, at 567–68. 
120. Judith McFarlane et al., Protection Orders and Intimate Partner Violence: An 18-Month 
Study of 150 Black, Hispanic, and White Women, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 614, 616–17 (2004).  “Our 
findings of significant reductions in violence scores over time among all of our participants, regardless 
of receipt or nonreceipt of the protection order, are consistent with abuse intervention findings reported 
by social and health researchers.” Id. at 616.  “This study clearly demonstrates that, irrespective of 
whether or not a 2-year protection order was granted, abused women who sought a protection order 
reported significantly lower threats of abuse, physical abuse, stalking, work harassment, and risk fac-
tors for femicide at 3, 6, 12, and 18 months after their initial contact with the justice system.”  Id. at 
617.
121. Id. at 616. 
122. See Benitez et al., supra note 59, at 382. 
123. McFarlane et al., supra note 120, at 617. 
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abuser that the law knew about his behavior.”124  In short, the CPO “becomes 
an announcement that the abused women refuses to ‘take it’ anymore and is 
acting on her own behalf.”125
Filing a CPO case has true benefits for the victim, but once the victim de-
cides she has no need to pursue the case, she can choose to dismiss it.  Unfor-
tunately, even though the victim or court has decided to end official intervention 
in the perpetrator’s life by terminating the case, the collateral consequences of 
the CPO case continue to haunt the perpetrator by effectively precluding him 
from becoming a contributing member of society. 
IV. A REMEDY TO ADDRESS THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES: JUDICIAL
SEALING
There is an urgent need to ameliorate the impact of collateral consequences 
for the millions of people once subject to a CPO case.  We must relieve the 
economic burden of these consequences to allow them to support their families 
and to be contributing members of their communities.  The best way to achieve 
this result is to limit public access to CPO cases that no longer have an active 
order. 
The collateral consequences of CPO cases arise because the public can ac-
cess those cases.126  Anyone can visit the courthouse to review a CPO file and 
its content.127  Some states also allow limited online access to CPO cases.128
124. Id.  The study concluded that the women “viewed the legal system as a force larger than 
themselves and as having power over the abuser that they themselves had lost as a result of the abuse.  
Moreover, they felt a need to have the legal system both approve and reinforce their decision to leave 
the abuser.” Id.
125. Id.
126. See Rebecca Hulse, Privacy and Domestic Violence in Court, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN
& L. 237, 261 (2010).  “[P]roceedings and records of cases containing criminal and civil direct domestic 
violence matters are public in the vast majority of states.”  Id. (discussing a wide range of privacy 
issues attendant to domestic violence cases). 
127. “State courts have long recognized the public’s right of access to court records and allowed 
physical access to paper records housed in individual courthouses.”  D.R. Jones, Protecting the Treas-
ure: An Assessment of State Court Rules and Policies for Access to Online Civil Court Records, 61
DRAKE L. REV. 375, 383 (2013).  “[P]roceedings and records of cases containing criminal and civil 
direct domestic violence matters are public in the vast majority of states.”  Hulse, supra note 126, at 
261.  Records that are only accessible at the courthouse have been termed to be cloaked in “political 
obscurity.”  This term was “developed to describe privacy protections built into pre-Internet court rec-
ords systems by virtue of the practical difficulty of accessing paper court records.”  Rebecca Green, 
Petitions, Privacy, and Political Obscurity, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 367, 372 (2013). 
128. “In general, state courts have proceeded very cautiously when considering which records to 
place online.”  Hulse, supra note 126, at 263.  Online access to CPO files is controlled by each court, 
and its interpretation of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (2012).  VAWA 
limits what information from a CPO case a court may place online, and it prohibits online access to 
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This information might include the name of the parties, filing and hearing 
dates.129
Courthouse access alone does not really offer any real obstacle to online 
dissemination of information contained in the CPO file.  It will “not stop enter-
prising data-gatherers, who, through the use of readily available technology, 
can circumvent any protection that limiting access to the courthouse otherwise 
offers.”130  Moreover, “those with the resources or determination can digitize 
print records for their own use.”131
There are additional ways the public may be able to access CPO case infor-
mation without ever visiting the courthouse or accessing the court record 
online.  Each time a court issues a CPO order, it is entered into the Protection 
Order File of the National Criminal Information Center (NCIC).132  At any 
given time, the NCIC file contains nearly one and one-half million civil protec-
tion orders.133  In addition to this national file, forty states maintain their own 
protection order files containing 1.8 million records.134  A majority of states 
allow public access to their protection order files. 135
Furthermore, many states, upon request, will conduct noncriminal back-
ground checks.136  The number of noncriminal background requests performed 
any information that “would be likely to publicly reveal the identity or location of the party protected 
under the order.”  18 U.S.C. § 2265(d)(3).  This provision in VAWA is intended to provide for the 
safety of the victim by limiting the victim’s personal information available on the internet. It restricts 
this information so a potential perpetrator cannot locate the victim.  VAWA does not restrict what 
perpetrator information may be placed on an online docket. 
129. See Hulse, supra note 126, at 267.  For example, in Maryland, a court will not allow remote 
access of the victim’s name, address, telephone number, date of birth, e-mail address and place of 
employment.  MD. RULES, Rule 16-1008.1. 
130. Jones, supra note 127, at 394. 
131. Id. at 395. 
132. The Federal Bureau of Investigation maintains the National Crime Information Center 
(NCIC). NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER, https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ncic 
[https://perma.cc/5B36-ALKH] (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).  It is a “collection of FBI intelligence data-
bases that provide support to federal, state and local law enforcement agencies.” JAMES B. JACOBS,
THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 18 (2015). 
133. On December 31, 2015, NCIC had 1,639,206 active Protection Order records—both per-
manent and temporary orders.  January 11, 2016, e-mail from Stephen G. Fischer Jr., Chief, Multimedia 
Productions, FBI - CJIS Division. (E-mail on file with author); see also Survey of State Criminal His-
tory Information Systems, supra note 11, at Table 4. 
134. See Survey of State Criminal History Information Systems, supra note 11, at Table 4. 
135. See id. at Table 7a.  The National Domestic Violence Registry also maintains a searchable 
database of convictions for domestic violence and domestic violence-related offenses that the public 
can access. See THE NATIONAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REGISTRY, INC., http://www.domesticviolence-
database.net/ [https://perma.cc/WNW5-VGRZ] (2012). 
136. See Jacobs, supra note 132, at 51 (“[A]ll states authorize their criminal records repositories 
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in this country is staggering.  In 2012, 39 states received over 20 million name-
based noncriminal justice background requests.137  They included requests for 
people who were seeking positions as schoolteachers, prospective adoptive and 
foster parents, day care providers, nonteaching school personnel including vol-
unteers, nurses and residential caregivers, volunteers working with children and 
hazardous material licensees.138  Ten states who received such a request in-
cluded the protection order information in their response.139
Once the public has access to information that a person has been named in 
a CPO case as a “batterer,” it leads to the corresponding collateral conse-
quences.140  The only way to ameliorate the impact of these consequences is to 
seal from public view CPO cases where no active order exists. 
Civil sealing is a well-established concept in our justice system.141  Courts 
have the inherent authority to seal civil cases.142  In Nixon v. Warner 
Communications, the United States Supreme Court stated, “the right to inspect 
and copy judicial records is not absolute.  Every court has supervisory power 
over its own records and files, and access has been denied where court files 
might have become a vehicle for improper purposes.”143 One of the “improper 
purposes” cited by the court was to use records “‘to gratify private spite or 
promote public scandal’ through the publication of ‘the painful and sometimes 
disgusting details of a divorce case.’”144
to provide certain private sector employers and not-for-profit organizations with rap sheet infor-
mation.”).  Congress has also authorized the FBI to conduct noncriminal background checks.  See FBI
IDENTITY HISTORY SUMMARY CHECKS, https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/identity-history-summary-
checks [https://perma.cc/F94Q-EMSK] (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).  For a discussion of the parameters 
of the FBI’s authority and the nature of the background checks, see Jacobs, supra note 132, at 43. 
137. See Survey of State Criminal History Information Systems, supra note 11, Table 19. 
138. See id. at 11. 
139. See id. at Table 7a, Table 14, and Table 19a. 
140. See supra Part II. 
141. For a thorough discussion of the constitutional and common law underpinnings of the seal-
ing remedy see Honorable T.S. Ellis, III, Sealing, Judicial Transparency and Judicial Independence,
53 VILL. L. REV. 939, 943–44 (2008) (arguing that no basis exists to support permanent sealing of civil 
and criminal cases). See also Andrew D. Goldstein, Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the Rules Gov-
erning Public Access to Information Generated Through Litigation, 81 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 375,
383–88 (2006) (discussing whether discovery should be subject to public access). 
142. “In the majority of states and districts, the rules governing sealing of judicial information 
come from judicial doctrine as opposed to rules of procedure.”  Goldstein, supra note 141, at 385. 
143. Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). 
144. Id.  These cases have included Clarence Clemons, the saxophonist in the E Street Band; 
rock guitarist Rick Derringer; Robert Selander, former chief executive officer of MasterCard; Paul 
Allair, former CEO of Xerox; Peter Bijur, former chairman of Texaco; and Vincent Camuto, founder 
of Nine West.  See Eric Rich & Dave Altmari, Elite Enjoy ‘Secret File’ Lawsuits, HARTFORD COURANT
(Feb. 9, 2003), http://www.courant.com/hc-secrecy-0209-story.html [https://perma.cc/4HLR-3TLB]. 
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Courts have been quite willing to seal the divorce cases of the rich and 
famous.145  Some of those who have had their civil cases sealed include 
Secretary of State John Kerry, and members of the Hearst family.146  For those 
cases involving the rich and famous, there is a “very real trend toward litigants 
and courts acting as though the dissemination of basic, official information 
about a legal proceeding is an inherent evil that must be prevented.”147  In 
addition, courts have sealed cases when “disclosure of such cases poses a 
greater risk to people of prominence than it would to others—their careers and 
incomes, and ultimately their families, could suffer”148
A 2008 survey conducted by the Federal Judicial Center of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States provides insight into the frequency of sealings 
in federal cases.149  For the orders and decisions issued by the judges, the court 
permanently sealed 0.2% of the civil cases and 1.6% of the criminal cases.150
The study found that civil cases were sealed for “one of two reasons: either they 
are qui tam actions filed under the False Claims Act, which requires that the 
cases be filed under seal, or they are sealed because one or both sides of the 
litigation want to keep facts in the case private.”151  The study also cited to one 
case where the federal court sealed the case to protect a party’s reputation.152
Courts have historically recognized the sensitive nature of domestic cases, 
and the need to limit access to those cases.  Until the early 1990s, most courts 
considered divorce cases private and the information in the case was “beyond 
the legitimate interests of the public.”153  Some have argued that divorce files 
should be “presumptively private” and the person or entity seeking access 
145. See id.
146. See Daniel Lombard, Comment, Top Secret: A Constitutional Look at the Procedural Prob-
lems Inherent in Sealing Civil Court Documents, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1067, 1067 (2006).  The author 
notes, “‘the influential and connected are well represented among the beneficiaries’ of sealed court 
files.” Id. at 1091. 
147. Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. & Michael H. Dore, Celebrity Justice: A New Double Standard, 
22 COMM. LAW. 3 (2014). 
148. Rich & Altmari, supra note 144. 
149. See Stephen Wm. Smith, Gagged, Sealed & Delivered: Reforming ECPA’s Secret Docket,
6 HARV. L & POL’Y REV. 313, 316 (2012). 
150. See id. at 316–17. 
151. TIM REAGAN & GEORGE CORT, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, SEALED CASES IN FEDERAL
COURTS, 30 (2009), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sealcafc.pdf/$file/sealcafc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UGC7-DTCP]. 
152. See id. at 9.  The court sealed a malpractice case pending discovery to protect a doctor’s 
reputation.  The study stated that “[a]lthough the judge is generally opposed to sealing cases, he saw 
no reason for these mere allegations to be public.” Id.
153. Laura W. Morgan, Strengthening the Lock on the Bedroom Door: The Case Against Access 
to Divorce Records Online, 17 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 45, 55 (2001). 
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should have the burden to show the necessity of the access.154  This is because 
“unrestricted public access . . . could constitute a devastating intrusion on one’s 
personal right of privacy and possibly irreparable loss of reputation and 
status.”155  While the public is entitled to know that their courts are fairly 
executing their judicial duties, “no legitimate purpose can be served by 
broadcasting the intimate details of a soured marital relationship.”156  New York 
courts seal their divorce records for 100 years.157  Parties in Virginia can file a 
request to seal their divorce records.158
A. The Proposed Sealing Remedy 
Judges decide seal to civil cases using one of three tests.  The first test 
considers whether “a compelling interest” justifies the sealing and would be 
narrowly tailored.159  In the second test, the court engages in a weighing process 
where it balances “the public interest in access against countervailing interests 
in privacy . . . .”160  In the final test, a court may grant the sealing request if the 
requesting party makes “a showing of ‘good cause’”161
A recent CPO sealing case from the Ohio Supreme Court, Schussheim v. 
Schussheim,162 incorporates all of these tests and is a model that courts can 
adopt to seal CPO cases.  The Schussheim court found that “a trial court has the 
inherent authority to grant an application to expunge and seal a record pertain-
ing to a dissolved CPO in an adult proceeding when unusual and exceptional 
circumstances exist,” and when “the interests of the applicant outweigh the 
legitimate interest of the government to maintain the record.”163
To fashion this remedy, the Ohio Supreme Court adopted a sealing remedy 
previously used in Ohio criminal cases.164  It did so because “[t]he inherent 
154. Id. at 63. 
155. Id. at 54. 
156. Id. at 55. 
157. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 235:4 (McKinney 2010). 
158. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124 (2016). 
159. Goldstein, supra note 141, at 385–86. 
160. Id. at 386. 
161. Id.
162. 998 N.E.2d 446, 447 (Ohio 2013).  The Schussheim case involved a CPO order that the 
parties and court dismissed. 
163. Id. at 447, 449. 
164. “In Pepper Pike, 66 Ohio St.2d at 376–377, 421 N.E.2d 1303, we recognized that courts 
have inherent authority to expunge and seal criminal records in ‘unusual and exceptional 
circumstances’ and noted that the basis for the authority is the constitutional right to privacy.” 
Schussheim, 998 N.E.2d at 448.  Ohio, twenty-eight other states, and Puerto Rico offer a judicial pro-
cess to seal or expunge criminal convictions.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2953.31 et seq (2010); ARK.
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authority of a court to expunge and seal a record does not turn on whether a 
proceeding is criminal or civil.”165
Similar to Ohio, a California court also applied a remedy typically used in 
California criminal cases to seal a CPO case.166  In that case, a person sought 
the sealing by using California’s Petition for Factual Innocence.167  The court 
had granted the petition in the criminal case where the person had been arrested 
for domestic violence, but never charged.168  The civil court relied on the 
granting of the criminal petition to seal and destroy the CPO file, including the 
restraining order.169
CODE ANN. §§ 16-90-1401 et seq. (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-308.8 (2016) (repealed in part); 
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 4373 (2015); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-803, 16-806 (West 2016); 20 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 2630/5.2c (2014); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-38-9-5, 35-38-9-6 (West 2016); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-6614 (2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 431.078, 533.250–533.262 (LexisNexis 2010); LA.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 971 (2016); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC. §§ 10-301 et seq. (LexisNexis 
2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A; ch. 140, §122 (2014); MINN. STAT. § 609A.02 (2015); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-71 (West 2015); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.245, 179.285, 179.301 
(LexisNexis 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:5 (2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:52-1 et seq (2005); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-28(D) (West 2016); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 160.58 , 216.00 et seq. 
(McKinney 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-145.5 (2015); N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-23(9) (2015); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 § 18(10) (2016); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122 (2016); 234 PA. CODE §§ 490, 790 
(2016); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 34, §§ 1725a-1 et seq. (2004); 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-1.3-1 et seq. 
(2015).; S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-5-920(B) (2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-6-8.1 (2014); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-32-101 (2016).  For an excellent compilation of judicial expungement or sealing remedies 
available in the United States, see Margaret Colgate Love, Resource Center: Restoration of Rights 
Project, NAT’L ASSOC. CRIM. DEF. L. (2016), http://www.nacdl.org/rightsrestoration/ 
[https://perma.cc/CLR2-WNRL]; see also Sahl, supra note 16. 
165. Schussheim, 998 N.E.2d at 449.  Since the Schussheim decision, two Ohio courts have 
addressed CPO sealing requests.  In Wetz v. Pomeroy, No. CA2014-03-039, 2014 WL 6158910, at *1 
(Ohio Ct. App., Nov. 17, 2014), the petitioner sought to seal three civil protection orders that had been 
dismissed at the request of the alleged victim.  The court refused to seal the dismissals because the 
alleged victim did not support the dismissal and the perpetrator faced criminal charges. See id at *2, 
at *3.  In Balsley v. Balsley, No. CT2014-0009, 2014 WL 4629672 (Ohio Ct. App., Sept. 15, 2014), 
the petitioner requested that the court seal a dissolved ex parte CPO.  The case was one of five cases 
the petitioner had filed requesting that the order be sealed.  The court found no unusual or exceptional 
circumstances to warrant the sealing because the petitioner had been involved in five domestic violence 
cases in ten months, although none resulted in an order.  The court decided that the conduct was rele-
vant for future proceedings. See id., at *2.  Other state courts recognize their inherent authority to seal 
criminal records.  These states include Alaska (Farmer v. State, 235 P.3d 1012, 1014 (Alaska 2010)), 
New York (Barker v. Binninger, 14 N.Y. 270, 278 (N.Y. 1856)); Vanderbilt v. Schreyer, 91 N.Y 646, 
648 (N.Y. 1880)), Minnesota (State v. M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d 276, 279 (Minn. 2013)), and Pennsylvania
(Commonwealth v. Malone, 366 A.2d 584, 589 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976)). 
166. See Brian Dinday, You CAN Expunge a Civil Court Restraining Order Docket in California 
(2008), http://www.avvo.com/legal-guides/ugc/you-can-expunge-a-civil-court-restraining-order-
docket-in-california [https://perma.cc/X74G-JJ5V]. 
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id.  The only other jurisdiction that discusses a remedy is Massachusetts.  It has a court 
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The New Jersey courts, facing the same question, have reached a different 
conclusion.  In the Matter of M.D.Z.,170 the Superior Court of New Jersey 
considered whether to expunge records related to a domestic violence 
incident.171  It had resulted in Mr. Z’s arrest, criminal charges, a civil restraining 
order, and a divorce action.172  The parties eventually reconciled and all of the 
cases were dismissed.173
The trial court granted Mr. Z’s expungement as to the criminal charges but 
not as to his civil actions.174  While the appellate court agreed, it recognized that 
the trial court’s order resulted in the “dichotomous treatment of criminal and 
civil records.”175  It also recognized that Mr. Z. might suffer stigma due to the 
domestic violence allegations.176  Notwithstanding all of this, the court refused 
to expunge the civil domestic violence cases because the legislature had not 
permitted the remedy by statute.177
This decision highlights the need to have courts acknowledge and use their 
inherent authority to seal CPO cases.  Although the New Jersey court 
recognized that Mr. Z suffered collateral consequences from both his criminal 
and civil cases, it felt constrained to act in the civil case because the legislature 
had not spoken.  The better result would have been for the New Jersey court to 
adopt the Schussheim weighing test to determine “whether ‘unusual and 
exceptional circumstances’ exist[ed] and whether the interests of the applicant 
outweigh[ed] the legitimate interest of the government to maintain the 
record.178  It is very likely the court would have sealed the CPO case using the 
Schussheim rule. 
B. Benefits of the Sealing Remedy 
The sealing remedy recommended in this article, and its attendant weighing 
process, is a narrow remedy that allows the courts to treat each case on an 
rule that allows impoundment of cases, including those with domestic violence orders.  See Boston
Herald, Inc. v. Sharpe, 737 N.E.2d 859, 870 (Mass. 2000) (reporting a court initially impounding do-
mestic violence file but later vacating the order when the perpetrator faced criminal charges for killing 
his wife, and the information in the file already had been disclosed to the public). 
170. 668 A.2d 423, 423 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995). 
171. Id. at 423–24. 
172. See id. at 424. 
173. See id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 425. 
176. See id. at 426. 
177. See id.
178. Schussheim v. Schussheim, 998 N.E.2d 446, 449 (Ohio 2013). 
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individual basis.  It gives a court the opportunity to examine an individual 
perpetrator’s need to have the case sealed.  Providing process and a remedy to 
the perpetrator is not antithetical to the CPO process.  As one author has noted, 
[c]onsidering the interests of defendants is critical for victim 
advocates.  Legal arguments that do not adequately address de-
fendants’ rights may reflect a view initially promoted by the 
battered women’s movement, which often portrayed batterers 
as “villains.”  However, caricatured depictions of perpetrators 
of abuse do not correspond with either social science research 
indicating several different types of abusers or with the obser-
vations of abusers by other actors within the legal system, in-
cluding judges.179
The sealing remedy, with its case-by-case evaluation, allows the court to 
balance the perpetrator’s need for the remedy with society’s corresponding 
need, if any, to keep the case public.180
The sealing remedy has another benefit that is unrelated to the perpetrator.  
The domestic violence victim may have a CPO order issued against her as well.  
This “mutual order” requires that both parties stay away from each other.181  As 
one author has noted, many victims do not oppose the mutual protection orders 
179.  Jessica Miles, We Are Never Ever Getting Back Together : Domestic Violence Victims, 
Defendants, & Due Process, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 141, 197 (2013).
180. Miles, supra note 5, at 198. The Schussheim case is a perfect example to demonstrate the 
individualized approach and that not all cases will result in sealing.  Upon remand, the trial court found 
Schussheim should not have his case sealed. Schussheim v Schussheim, No. CA2014-03-042, 2015 
WL 1005340, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2015).  The trial court concluded the state’s interest in 
maintaining the record outweighed Schussheim’s interest in having it sealed.  The decision was driven 
by the fact that Schussheim had engaged in another incident with his daughter and his ex-wife no 
longer supported the sealing. See id. at *2. 
181. “Mutual protection orders are civil protection orders that are entered against both parties.” 
Elizabeth Topliffe, Note, Why Civil Protection Orders Are Effective Remedies for Domestic Violence 
but Mutual Protection Orders Are Not, 67 IND. L.J. 1039, 1053 (1992).  Mutual protection orders arise 
because the perpetrator may argue that he was subject to domestic violence.  There are strong reasons 
to issue mutual protection orders in only rare cases. See id. at 1060.  “Victims often find the issuance 
of mutual protection orders humiliating and may believe they are being blamed for the violence.”  Id.
at 1058.  There are a number of reasons why respondents may request their own order.  “Batterers may 
seek orders of protection in response to their victims’ petitions for orders, with the hope that this will 
lead the judge to deny both petitions.  They may seek orders to gain leverage over partners who are 
attempting to leave and obtain sole custody of the children.  Or, in a race to the courthouse, batterers 
engaged in custody or divorce battles with their victims may attempt to obtain protection orders before 
their victims do in an effort to strengthen their own cases.  Batterers who are facing criminal domestic 
violence charges may try to seek such orders in the hope that this will benefit their criminal defense.”  
Emily J. Sack, Battered Women & the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence Policy,
2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1682 (2004). 
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because the victims “may want to expedite the process, cooperate with the law-
yer and the judge, and avoid violent reactions from their abusers.”182  Judges 
may also issue a mutual protection order even when the defendant does not 
request it.183
Victims who are on the receiving end of a mutual CPO suffer the same 
lasting negative consequences as the perpetrators.184  The CPO “prejudices the 
victim in future [civil protection order] proceedings.”185  In addition, it “can be 
used in divorce proceedings, civil proceedings on domestic violence, and 
criminal proceedings against the abuser.”186  The mutual CPO also affects 
custody and visitation issues.187
The sealing remedy has another added benefit, it may encourage more 
victims to file CPO cases.  Victims choose not to file CPOs for a number of 
reasons.188  They involve some of the same reasons why victims do not call the 
police when an act of domestic violence occurs.  Twenty-two states and the 
District of Columbia require the responding police officer to arrest the primary 
aggressor.189  There is ongoing debate about the value of mandatory arrest pol-
icies for perpetrators of domestic violence.190  One of the leveled criticisms is 
182. Topliffe, supra note 180, at 1055. 
183. See id.  “The VAWA of 1994 [18 USCS § 2265(c) (1994)] contains a provision specifically 
denying mutual orders full faith and credit by other states if there has been no cross-petition or coun-
terpetition filed by the respondent, or if such a petition has been filed, but the judge has not made 
specific findings that each party is entitled to an order.  Despite this provision, state judges have per-
sisted in issuing these mutual orders without meeting the federal full faith and credit requirements.”  
Sack, supra note 180, at 1683. 
184. Topliffe, supra note 180, at 1062. 
185. Id. at 1061. 
186. Id. at 1062. 
187. See id.; see also Sack, supra note 180, at 1683. 
188. These reasons may be tied to their desire to continue to maintain the relationship with the 
perpetrator and include “safety, children, religion, economics, immigration status, community support 
and love.”  Leigh Goodmark, Healthy Alternatives to Prosecution Can Help Victims, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/09/10/going-after-abusers-like-nfl-player-
ray-rice/healthy-alternatives-to-prosecution-can-help-victims [https://perma.cc/5TPK-XX6Y]. 
189. Johnson, supra note 115, at 158. 
190. See Meghan A. Novisky & Robert L. Peralta, When Women Tell: Intimate Partner Violence 
and the Factors Related to Police Notification, 21 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 65, 67 (2014). 
Proponents of mandatory policies argue that mandatory policies are necessary 
because they require otherwise reluctant prosecutors to follow through with pros-
ecution; ensure uniform treatment of domestic violence crimes even when the 
victim does not cooperate or want the criminal case to proceed; remove the bur-
den of choosing whether to prosecute from the victim; and reduce racial discrim-
ination in the criminal justice system by seeking to ensure that all perpetrators, 
regardless of race, are treated similarly. 
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that “victims hesitate reporting their abuse because of perceived pressures by 
the legal system for victims to leave their significant other and to support pros-
ecution.”191
There may be racial issues as well.  Mandatory arrest involves more people 
from “lower-income and minority-group households.”192  For a woman of color, 
calling 911 for help may mean exposing the perpetrator to what is seen as a 
“racist penal system.”193  The women “perceive that reporting violence in the 
African-American community is an opportunity for the public to use the infor-
mation to reinforce negative stereotypes of the African-American community.” 
194  A victim may be more willing to report an incident of domestic violence if 
she knew the perpetrator could seal the CPO case at its conclusion to avoid the 
“negative stereotypes.”195
Even victims who want to seal their filed CPO case do not find an easy path. 
Rebecca Hulse surveyed courts in Arizona, Colorado, Washington D.C., 
Illinois, New York, and Rhode Island to determine the efficacy of the sealing 
process for the victim.196  Although the courts surveyed allowed victims to file 
Carey & Solomon, supra note 115, at 222. By contrast,opponents of the manda-
tory arrest believe that these policies do not serve the larger goal of ending do-
mestic violence, deny the needs of individual victims, and even replace the con-
trol of the abuser with the control of the state. Opponents are concerned that these 
universally applied strategies do not account for the reasons women stay in abu-
sive relationships; ignore superseding financial, cultural, or emotional issues; 
force a decision on victims without taking into account their individual needs; and 
disempower victims and strip them of their autonomy. 
Id.  Studies also show that “revictimization is a widely documented result of forced victim participa-
tion.”  Han, supra note 116, at 184. 
191. Novisky & Peralta, supra note 189, at 67.  This study also found that those victims who 
contacted the police to report the domestic violence were more likely to have a perpetrator who used 
drugs or alcohol. Id. at 77.  Studies also show that married victims who live with their spouse are 
unlikely to report the abuse. See Jeffrey Ackerman & Tony P. Love, Ethnic Group Differences in 
Police Notification About Intimate Partner Violence, 20 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 162, 177 (2014). 
192. Schmidt & Sherman, supra note 59, at 602. See Buzawa & Buzawa supra note 59, at 125 
(Raising three critiques of mandatory arrest policy; it does not work, it is inhumane, and the very people 
who it is trying to protect, do not want it.). 
193. Johnson, supra note 115, at 165. 
194. Lisa M. Martinson, Comment, An Analysis of Racism and Resources for African-American 
Female Victims of Domestic Violence in Wisconsin, 16 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 259, 264 (2001).  The au-
thor also notes the other issues that women of color consider before reporting an incident of domestic 
violence including “the African-American race image as a whole, the position of African-American 
men, the view of African-American families, their economic situation, and the system’s responsiveness 
if they do make a call for help.”  Id. at 263. 
195. Id. at 264. 
196. The specific courts surveyed were as follows: Pinal County, Arizona; Denver County, Col-
orado; Washington, D.C.; Cook County, Illinois; Brooklyn, New York; and the Rhode Island Family 
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a motion to seal, Hulse found that it was very difficult for the victim to secure 
the order to seal.197  This was particularly true if there was an accompanying 
criminal case.198
Victims, like the perpetrators, could benefit from a clear and articulable test 
that would allow them to seal cases.199  The Schussheim test provides sufficient 
guidance to courts and encompasses a straightforward standard that allows the 
court to engage in a thoughtful weighing process that considers the interest of 
the victim and the perpetrator.200
This Article’s sealing remedy would only apply to those cases where there 
is no longer an active order—either a once-issued order that has expired, or a 
case has been terminated by either the victim or the court.  If the CPO case has 
no active order, there is no legitimate purpose for the public to have access to 
it.
It is important to note that the sealing remedy urged in this article need not 
be irrevocable.  There may be cases where the court or law enforcement may 
need access to the sealed order.  For example, if there were another domestic 
violence incident it would be important for a court to have access to the infor-
mation.201  The sealing remedy proposed in this article is based on a trial court’s 
inherent authority to apply this remedy.  This same inherent authority would 
Court. See Hulse, supra note 126, at 273, n.216. 
197. See id. at 274. 
198. See id.
199. In Schussheim, the Court found the victim’s support of the sealing request gave rise to the 
“unusual and exceptional circumstances.”  Schussheim v. Schussheim, 998 N.E.2d 446, 447 (Ohio 
2013).
200. The Schussheim case is a perfect example of this individualized assessment, and that not all 
cases should be sealed.  Upon remand the trial court found Schussheim should not have his case sealed. 
See Schussheim v Schussheim, No. CA2014-03-042, 2015 WL 1005340, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 9, 
2015).  The trial court concluded the state’s interest in maintaining the record outweighed 
Schussheim’s interest in having it sealed.  The decision was driven by the fact that Schussheim had 
engaged in another incident with his daughter and his ex-wife no longer supported the sealing.  See id.
at *2. 
201. Courts considering whether to grant a CPO commonly admit evidence of prior abuse be-
tween the parties.  See Erin R. Collins, The Evidentiary Rules of Engagement in the War Against Do-
mestic Violence, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 397, 415 (2015).  The courts may also use this evidence for visit-
ation or custody decisions. See Jane H. Aiken & Jane C. Murphy, Evidence Issues in Domestic 
Violence Civil Cases, 34 FAM. L.Q. 43, 58 (2000).  It would be easy for the petitioner to alert the court 
to a sealed order.  “Many protection order statutes, for example, include a directive to the petitioner to 
include the incidents of past abuse.” Id. At 57.  In Ohio, the civil protection order application asks the 
petitioner to disclose any known court cases involving the respondent—including civil protection order 
cases. See The Supreme Court of Ohio & The Ohio Judicial System, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
PROTECTION ORDER FORMS, http://www.su-
premecourt.ohio.gov/JCS/domesticViolence/protection_forms/DVForms/default.asp 
[https://perma.cc/9ZK6-VP7N] (last visited Feb. 7, 2017). 
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give the court the power to unseal a case if circumstances warranted it. 
There are other process-laden reasons to adopt the sealing remedy, 
particularly for those cases where only an ex parte order once existed.  The 
court issues an ex parte order in a proceeding where the perpetrator does not 
appear to defend the allegations.202  There are other areas of the law where 
allegations, unproven in trial, remain sealed from public view. 
Most states seal arrest records that did not result in a conviction.203  These 
states recognize that an arrest, without a conviction, can result in harmful 
collateral consequences to the individual involved.204  Similarly, courts shield 
testimony given in a grand jury proceeding.205  They do so because of the 
concern that unproven accusations before the grand jury may become public to 
the detriment of the accused.206
A sealing remedy is the most effective way to address the collateral conse-
quences faced by all of those once subject to a CPO.  They are not fortunate 
enough to be one of the celebrities in this country who seem to be immune to 
the scourge of collateral consequences stemming from an incident of domestic 
violence.207  No one exemplifies this immunity more than professional athletes 
do.
There have been numerous professional athletes who have been accused of 
202. See Stoever, supra note 1, at 1073. 
203. See Fruqan Mouzon, Forgive Us Our Trespasses: The Need for Federal Expungement Leg-
islation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 32 (2008).  These states include: Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colo-
rado, Connecticut, D.C., Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia and Wyoming.  See id. At 
32, n.142. 
204. Id. at 32. 
205. See Lombard, supra note 146, at 1092. 
206. Id.  “[B]y preserving the secrecy of the [grand jury] proceedings, we assure that persons 
who are accused but exonerated by the grand jury will not be held up to public ridicule.”  Douglas Oil 
Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 219 (1979). 
207. See Boutrous & Dore, supra note 147, at 3. (“The symbolic figure of Blind Justice presides 
over courthouses throughout the country. Inside the courtroom, however, there is a growing trend to 
apply two different standards of justice: one for celebrities and one for everybody else.”). 
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committing an act of domestic violence.208  Some have suffered either no pro-
fessional consequences,209 or limited consequences.210  Most have been able to 
208. In the five-year period, January 1989 to 1994, fifty-six current or former professional foot-
ball players were accused of domestic violence. See Brant Webb, Unsportsmanlike Conduct: Curbing 
the Trend of Domestic Violence in the National Football League and Major League Baseball, 20 AM.
U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 741, 742–43 (2012); see also, e.g., The Associated Press, NHL: Kings 
Goalie Prospect Faces Domestic Violence Charges, HAIDA GWAII OBSERVER (Nov. 18, 2015), 
http://www.haidagwaiiobserver.com/national/sport/351510231.html?mobile=true
[https://perma.cc/V8TP-NH5J]; Sneha Shankar, Ronda Rousey Takes a Dig at Floyd Mayweather’s 
Domestic Violence Record at ESPY Awards, IB TIMES, (July 16, 2015), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/ronda-rousey-takes-dig-floyd-mayweathers-domestic-violence-record-espy-
awards-2011340 [https://perma.cc/9YY8-5BBP]; Associated Press, Shock’s Johnson Pleads Not 
Guilty in Domestic Violence Case, USA TODAY (July 15, 2015), http://www.usato-
day.com/story/sports/wnba/2015/07/15/shocks-johnson-pleads-not-guilty-in-domestic-violence-
case/30197675/ [https://perma.cc/B7M5-LMKL]; Tribune Wire Reports, Ex-Bear Ray McDonald 
Charged with Domestic Violence., CHICAGO TRIBUNE (July 9, 2015), http://www.chicagotrib-
une.com/sports/football/bears/ct-ray-mcdonald-charged-20150709-story.html
[https://perma.cc/7EXU-A2FU]; L.A. Kings’ Slava Voynov Pleads No Contest in Domestic Violence 
Case, REUTERS (July 2, 2015), http://ca.reuters.com/article/sportsnews/idcakcn0pc2n220150702 
[https://perma.cc/25NK-XZJX]; Josh Peter, Hope Solo’s Domestic Violence Case Reinstated, USA
TODAY (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/soccer/2015/10/02/hope-solo-domestic-
violence-case-reinstated/73218200/# [https://perma.cc/Q2JV-BLGC]; Kyle Fredrickson, Former
Cowboy Tyreek Hill Receives New Legal Representation in Domestic Violence Trial, THE
OKLAHOMAN (July 17, 2015), http://newsok.com/article/5434485 [https://perma.cc/YT75-SE4U]; 
Glory Johnson Pleads Not Guilty in Domestic Violence Case Involving Ex-Brittney Griner, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (July 15, 2015), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/basketball/glory-johnson-pleads-
not-guilty-domestic-violence-case-article-1.2293307 [https://perma.cc/MGJ9-SGBB]; Matt Bones-
teel, Horrific Details Emerge from Greg Hardy’s Domestic-Violence Case, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2015/11/06/horrific-details-emerge-
from-greg-hardys-domestic-violence-case/ [https://perma.cc/J354-LFJG]; Rich Hammond, Kings Sus-
pend Prospect Bartosak After Domestic-Violence Charges, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Nov. 15, 2015), 
http://www.ocregister.com/articles/kings-692637-prospect-domestic.html [https://perma.cc/T5YR-
9YSJ]; Ryan Grenoble, Ryan Grenoble, NFL Won’t Discipline Johnny Manziel In Domestic Violence 
Case, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/johnny-manziel-nfl-
domestic-violence-discipline_us_564bb0ace4b045bf3df19643 [https://perma.cc/CRY8-99T7]; Jade 
Walker, Rockies Shortstop Jose Reyes Arrested for Domestic Violence, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 10, 
2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/jose-reyes-arrest-domestic-vio-
lence_us_56418ac1e4b0307f2caecfd3 [https://perma.cc/E9D8-MHBC]; Mike Bates, Jose Reyes’ Ar-
rest For Domestic Violence Puts MLB In The Spotlight, NPR (Nov. 11, 2015), 
http://www.npr.org/2015/11/11/455657466/jose-reyes-arrest-for-domestic-violence-puts-mlb-in-the-
spotlight [https://perma.cc/73AZ-SCEY]; Christine Brennan, Ray Rice Deserves Second Chance in 
NFL,  USA TODAY (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2015/08/05/ray-rice-do-
mestic-abuse-video-espn-free-agent/31191227/ [https://perma.cc/6XW9-ZAA8]. 
209. The players include the following: Harvey Armstrong, Scott Davis, Mark Gastineau, Vance 
Johnson, Clarence Kay, Lorenzo Lynch, Warren Moon, Freddie Joe Nunn, Gerald Perry, Aaron Wal-
lace, Dan Wilkinson, Otis Wilson, and John Stephens.  See Bethany P. Withers, The Integrity of the 
Game: Professional Athletes and Domestic Violence, 1 HARV. J. SPORTS AND ENT. L. 146, 171–72 
(2010).  Other athletes include: boxer Mike Tyson (see Associated Press, Robin Took Best Punch, 
Tyson Says in Biography, L.A. TIMES (June 23, 1989), http://articles.latimes.com/1989-06-
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23/sports/sp-2706_1_tyson-s-managers-tyson-friend-jose-torres-robin-givens
[https://perma.cc/5Y6N-AV6F]); baseball player Francisco Rodriguez (see Chuck Schilken, Francisco 
Rodriguez Arrested for Domestic Violence Last Month, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2012), http://arti-
cles.latimes.com/2012/oct/13/sports/la-sp-sn-francisco-rodriguez-krod-20121013
[https://perma.cc/3N8Q-F5BJ]); basketball player Lance Stephenson (see John Lauinger, Lance Stephen-
son, Indiana Pacers NBA player, Arrested for Pushing His Girlfriend Down the Stairs, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 16, 
2010), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/lance-stephenson-indiana-pacers-nba-player-ar-
rested-pushing-girlfriend-stairs-article-1.204174 [https://perma.cc/KW4P-KJW3]; see also Tom
Ziller, The NBA’s Domestic Violence Policy Must Improve, SB NATION (Nov. 21, 2014),
http://www.sbnation.com/nba/2014/11/21/7258891/nba-domestic-violence-jeff-taylor-michele-rob-
erts. [https://perma.cc/G46F-T372])); football player Mark Fields (see Jackee Coe, Former NFL player 
Mark Fields arrested in Goodyear, AZ REPUBLIC (Aug. 11, 2010), http://archive.azcen-
tral.com/news/articles/2010/08/10/20100810goodyear-mark-fields-arrested.html
[https://perma.cc/6DMP-KHSC]); football player Phillip Merling (Steve Eder, Tackling the Story of 
Domestic Abuse and the N.F.L., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/times-in-
sider/2014/11/21/tackling-the-story-of-domestic-abuse-and-the-n-f-l/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/YUA3-
JBLL]); basketball player Jason Kidd (see Withers, supra note 208, at 167); football player Greg Hardy 
(see Michael Gordon, Joseph Person & Jonathan Jones, Panthers Greg Hardy Guilty of Assaulting 
Female, Communicating Threats, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (July 15, 2014), http://www.charlotte-
observer.com/news/local/crime/article9140591.html [https://perma.cc/J6W9-RUV5]); boxer Floyd 
Mayweather (see Tony Manfred, Floyd Mayweather Has a Disturbing History of Domestic Violence,
BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 25, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/floyd-mayweather-domestic-violence-
history-2015-4 [https://perma.cc/P7NV-6ARX]); hockey player Semyon Varlamov (see Jordan Stef-
fen, Avs’ Semyon Varlamov’s Ex-Girlfriend Claims Years of Abuse in Lawsuit, DENVER POST (Oct. 
27, 2014), http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_26809855/avs-semyon-varlamovs-ex-girlfriend-
claims-years-abuse [https://perma.cc/2ZFA-DGEQ]); baseball player Brett Myers (see Webb, supra
note 207, at 749–51 (Myers “was treated as a celebrity by court officers, who shook his hand and patted 
him on the back”)); baseball player Elijah Dukes (see Withers, supra note 194, at 162–63); baseball 
player Milton Bradley (see Tessa Berenson, MLB Player’s Violent Marriage Sheds Light on Domestic 
Abuse, TIME (Apr. 9, 2015), http://time.com/3815728/milton-bradley-domestic-violence/
[https://perma.cc/M4LY-JDB2]); and basketball player Lance Stephenson (see Larry Celona & Chris-
tina Carrega, Former HS Hoops Star Busted for Allegedly Pushing Baby Mama Down Stairs, N.Y. 
POST (Aug. 16, 2010), http://nypost.com/2010/08/16/former-hs-hoops-star-busted-for-allegedly-push-
ing-baby-mama-down-stairs/ [https://perma.cc/643J-3L84]). 
210. The players include the following: football player Ray Rice (see Justin Worland, Roger
Goodell Defends Ray Rice’s 2-Game Suspension, TIME (Aug. 1, 2014), 
http://time.com/3072840/roger-goodell-ray-rice-suspension-nfl/ [https://perma.cc/NYZ9-D2ZH] (sus-
pended two games)); hockey player Slava Voynov (see Nathan Fenno, Kings’ Slava Voynov Pleads 
No Contest in Deal in Domestic Violence Case, L.A. TIMES (July 2, 2015), 
http://www.latimes.com/sports/sportsnow/la-sp-sn-slava-voynov-pleads-no-contest-domestic-vio-
lence-case-20150702-story.html [https://perma.cc/5FR2-D8XR] ) (indefinitely suspended but still re-
ceiving his salary after assaulting his wife)); basketball player Jared Sullinger (see David Abel & John 
R. Ellement, Jared Sullinger Domestic Violence Charges Dismissed; Woman Refused to Testify 
Against Celtics Player, BOSTON GLOBE (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.boston.com/2013/10/28/domes-
tic-violence-charges-against-boston-celtics-player-jared-sullinger-dismissed-woman-refused-testify-
against-him/mq6ofnF7f99ckEmwIJQypI/story.html [https://perma.cc/JD6G-L9QW]) (suspended one 
game after pushing his girlfriend)); basketball player Ron Artest, (suspended for seven games after 
assaulting his wife; see Withers, supra note 208, at 167; Associated Press, Artest is Allowed to Return 
to the Kings, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2007), http://articles.latimes.com/2007/mar/11/sports/sp-nbarep11 
[https://perma.cc/6LX2-7G7C]); and Dallas Cowboys defensive end Greg Hardy described as 
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continue with their professional careers as if the act of domestic violence had 
not occurred.  Most recently, the National Football League faced intense criti-
cism over its handling of a domestic violence incident involving Ray Rice.211
Notwithstanding his act of domestic violence, Ray Rice was reinstated to play 
football just one year after his act was captured on camera and viewed by mil-
lions of people.212
Even the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Schussheim hints at the caste 
system of collateral consequences.  Schussheim described himself as an “up-
standing citizen” with “an unblemished criminal record.”213  Schussheim ex-
plained in his court documents that he was a manager for a Fortune 500 com-
pany.214  Would the Ohio Supreme Court have reached the same conclusion and 
sealed his dismissed CPO if he had not been such a powerful and prominent 
citizen?  The answer to this question might lie in a case the Ohio Supreme Court 
decided in the same term as the Schussheim case. 
In State v. Boykin,215 the Ohio Supreme Court had to decide if it would ap-
ply the sealing remedy—the same as it had applied in Schussheim—to someone 
who had received a full and unconditional gubernatorial pardon of her criminal 
convictions.216  Boykin sought a pardon, and the subsequent sealing, to assist 
her with the collateral consequences of her convictions.217  The governor 
granted her a full and unconditional pardon of her convictions in November 
2009.218  This pardon, under Ohio law, “releases the offender from the entire 
punishment prescribed for his offense, and from all the disabilities consequent 
on his conviction.”219
Armed with this information, Boykin sought to seal her convictions using 
“woman-beating abuser.” Justin Block, Greg Hardy’s Domestic Violence Record Expunged by Judge,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/greg-hardy-domestic-vio-
lence-expunged_us_563cb211e4b0411d307098d2 [https://perma.cc/QWN6-YAGP]. 
211. See Ray Sanchez, NFL’s Goodell: I’m Staying; ‘We will get our house in order’ on Domes-
tic Violence, CNN (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/19/us/goodell-domestic-vio-
lence/index.html [https://perma.cc/DQH3-GP6D]. 
212. See Tom Goldman, NFL’s Effort to Combat Domestic Violence May Go For the Long 
Game, NPR (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/08/12/431567185/nfls-effort-to-combat-do-
mestic-violence-may-go-for-the-long-game [https://perma.cc/2NB9-YU78]. 
213. See Schussheim v Schussheim, No. CA2014-03-042, 2015 WL 1005340, at *1 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Mar. 9, 2015). 
214. Trial court documents in Schussheim v. Schussheim, on file with author. 
215.   4 N.E.3d 980, 980 (Ohio 2013).  The author represented Boykin in her Ohio Supreme 
Court case. 
216. See id. at 981. 
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. Id. at 984. 
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the sealing remedy recognized and used by the Ohio Supreme Court in the 
Schussheim case.220  The Ohio Supreme Court rejected Boykin’s argument that 
the pardon should lead to an automatic sealing of her pardoned convictions.221
The court rejected the argument, in large measure, because the Ohio legislature 
had not created a statutory remedy for pardoned convictions.222
The Ohio Supreme Court found no such obstacle in the Schussheim case.  
The court acknowledged that the Ohio legislature had not adopted a sealing 
remedy for CPO cases.223  However, unlike Boykin, the Schussheim court did 
not use the lack of legislative will to prevent it from constructing a sealing rem-
edy; instead, the court decided that a trial court could use its inherent authority 
to seal a dismissed CPO case.224
Was Boykin’s argument so different from Schussheim’s that it merited a 
different result?  Conversely, was the fact that Schussheim was a prominent 
citizen with “no criminal record” the real difference?  Boykin had certainly 
committed her criminal offenses, but she had received a gubernatorial pardon 
for those convictions.  It could be that the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision was 
based on the divergent paths Schussheim and Boykin travelled to the court-
house steps. 
Whatever motivated the court’s decisions, both cases highlight how hard it 
is for a perpetrator to get past what he or she has done, whether it is a criminal 
offense or an act of domestic violence.  The collateral consequences continue 
to plague the perpetrator. 
V. CONCLUSION
Civil domestic violence filings generate over a million CPOs each year.225
Even when the CPO case is no longer active, the perpetrator continues to suffer 
stigma and prejudicial legal consequences.226  Courts need to adopt a sealing 
remedy to end these collateral consequences. 
Suggesting a sealing remedy is not without controversy.  It may raise con-
cern that domestic violence victims and their experiences are unimportant.  But 
220. See id. at 985. 
221. See id. at 985, 988. 
222. See id. at 988 (“It is within the purview of the General Assembly to provide that automatic 
entitlement to sealing of a criminal record is a consequence of a pardon. But in the absence of such a 
provision, we hold that a gubernatorial pardon does not automatically entitle the recipient to have the 
record of the pardoned conviction sealed.”). 
223. Schussheim v. Schussheim, 998 N.E.2d 446, 449 (Ohio 2013). 
224. Id. at 449. 
225. See Sheeran & Meyer, supra note 6, at 3. 
226. See supra Part III.B. 
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this article is not about forgetting the victims of the domestic violence.  Rather, 
it recognizes that a sealing remedy may be beneficial to perpetrators and to 
victims.  For those victims who have chosen to end a case, or to allow an order 
to expire, the collateral consequences of that order should end as well. 
The sealing remedy allows those perpetrators who want to have a chance to 
be contributing members of their communities.  “People grow and change, and 
disclosures of information from their past can inhibit their ability to reform their 
behavior, to have a second chance, or to alter their life’s direction.”227
This is particularly true for those CPO perpetrators who seek employment. 
Without income, the perpetrator cannot support his family and provide stability 
to them, even if he is living separately from his family.  Children greatly suffer 
the effects of the unemployment.  “When it comes to family stability—regard-
less of whether the parents are married, cohabitating, single, or in another type 
of family arrangement—children whose families experience unemployment are 
more likely to face a destabilizing change . . . .”228  This is important because 
research suggests that “instability seems to matter more than family structure 
for [children’s] cognitive and health outcomes . . . .”229  A sealing remedy for 
inactive CPO cases is a step to provide that stability.230
It has been difficult in our society to offer true forgiveness to those who 
have committed acts condemned by society.  Nevertheless, there is great power 
and redemption in forgiveness.  The greatest example is the church shootings 
that occurred in Charleston, South Carolina on July 6, 2015.231  The gunman, a 
self-proclaimed white racist, took aim at a black church, Emmanuel African 
Episcopal Methodist, murdering nine parishioners.232  At the time of the shoot-
ings, the families of those victims responded not with anger and vengeance, but 
mercy.  As one of the newspapers reported, a “daughter of one victim told an 
interviewer that everyone, including the killer, deserves a ‘second chance.’”233
The reporter further noted that this forgiveness is “a contrast to our political 
culture.”234
227. Jones, supra note 127, at 408–09. 
228. Vallas et al., supra note 16, at 13. 
229. Id.  “Policies that help adults as both parents and workers can have a profound effect on a 
child’s long-term outlook and well-being.”  Id. at 15. 
230. See Sahl, supra note 16, at 433. See Vallas et al., supra note 16, at 14. 
231. See Karen Workman & Andrea Kannapell, The Charleston Shooting: What Happened, N.Y.
TIMES (June 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/us/the-charleston-shooting-what-hap-
pened.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/KCZ9-ZKG4]. 
232. See id.
233. Michael Gerson, The Power of Forgiveness in Charleston, WASH. POST (June 22, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-power-of-forgiveness/2015/06/22/a331c77e-190d-
11e5-bd7f-4611a60dd8e5_story.html [https://perma.cc/E229-DE9Q]. 
234. Id.
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It is time to give a second chance to domestic violence perpetrators.  This 
second chance will occur only if a remedy exists to seal CPO cases. 
